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A Survey of Public Utility Regulation
in the United States

The regulation of private industry, viewed from a histor
ical background, has oscillated between two poles of social theoz
ies, collectivism and individualism. Under systems of paternal

ism, mercantilism and feudalism, individual initiative was great
ly restricted for enterprise existed only through the consent of

the State and in the interest of the State.
With the ushering in of a new economic theory which looked

to competition as the mode of regulating industry, individual

initiative came into its own, while governmental interference
in business went by the boards. Under this theory of laissez-

faire, competition was the life of trade, and public welfare c
could best be served by free competition.

The origin of machine industry, bringing with it an era of

free competition, changed the whole economic system. During this
era of free competition enterprise developed rapidly and ’’the

captain of industry, the substantial business man, was inducted

into the seats of the mighty where he presently took precedence .
of the Absentee Landlord and the Merchant Prince, who had recent

ly been his oetters”.^*

The rise of absentee ownership and the informal method

of management which characterized it led to a special class of
1. Veblen, Thorstein, Absentee Ownership Ch.4, B.W. Huebsch Inc.
1923.

2.

evils in those enterprises which were granting service to the pub
lic, and as a result "the most rugged individuals of American
2

individualism",’the western farmers, initiated a storm of protest

against unfair competition, rebating, discriminations, and exorb
itant prices charged by the railroads.

This so-called Granger Reaction resulted in a wave of
maximum rate regulation in Western States. In 1876 the Supreme
Court of the United States upheld the constitutionality of the

State of Illinois to prescribe a schedule of maximum

rates for

"a business affected with a public interest" in the decision of

Munn vs Illinois. ' Thus the old concept that certain classes of
industry are affected with a public interest and hence should be

regulated was revivified. This event marks the beginning of Pub

lic Utility Regulation in the United States.
A history of regulation must start with the transportation
utilities for they were the pioneers, and consequently from the
first came under the police power of the state. The turnpikes and

canals fell under the control of the state, because the netion-^

was prevalent before 1830 that it was the duty of the state to
provide for inland transportation. With the advent of the rail

road the regulation of this form of common carrier was justified
under the theory that a railroad was a public highway. wAs in
1830 the Federal Government stepped aside for state governments,

so in 1850 state governments assigned to corporations the duty
-

•

■

■■ ■■

2. See Beard, Charles A, The Myth of Rugged American Individual
ism, Harper’s Dec. 1931
1
si
3. 94 U.S. 113 ?
f‘ ‘
‘

3,

4
of furnishing inland transportation"
The new order that originated, with the machine industry
saw the development of the corporate form of business organizat

ion from the rather unwieldy partnership form of organization.
So with the decline of the theory that it was the duty of the

state to provide for inland transportation we find the ^tate del
egating this duty to private enterprise through the corporate

franchise. The states for the most part were very liberal in
granting franchises, for the demand was usually for more railroads
to beget competition.
Regulation by the Charter

"A franchise is any special right or privelege conferred
5.
by legislative power on corporations or persons."
Franchises

are of two types, (1) general, (2) special. The general franchise
is simply the franchise to be a corporation. "The charter of a

corporation is the law which gives it existence as such. That is
its general charter which can be repealed at the will of the
6•
legislature." The special franchise conveys with it the power
to use. "A special franchise is the right, granted by the public
to use public property for a public use, but for private profit,

such as the right to build and operate a railroad, in the streets
7.
of a city."
These early charters granted to corporations to construct
and use railroads contained many clauses granting the power of

4. Adams, H.C., In introduction to Dixon, F.H., State Railroad
Control, Thomas Y. Crowell and Co. 1896 p. 6
5. 114 Minnesota Reports 95, 105 (1911)
6. Lord vs Equitable Life Association 194 N.Y. 212,225 (1909)
7. ibid, p ?

4

eminent domain, specifying routes, controlling construction and
prescribing some details of operation, and length of life; some

charters were limited as to life, but most of them ran for 99

years or for perpetuity. In order to encourage the building of
railroads special clauses were often inserted granting tax exemp

tion for a period of years; while others restricted the variety
of business and the amount of land it might hold.

The clauses dealing with rates were of three types. Usual
ly the charter took the form of a prescribed schedule of maximum

rates. A second type of charter placed a limitiation upon the net

income resulting from fares, tolls or rates.

For example the

corporation might be restricted to a 20 per cent return on their
common stock. A third type was a type peculiar to

New England

States. These charters contained the stipulation that after a

period of years, usually 25, but often 10 or 15, and every 20

years after, the legislature had the power to prescribe a new
schedule of rates if the income was greater than a specified perp
centage of the corporate investment. •

Early franchises were granted almost exclusively by the
state, and many of the privileges were granted with a complete

8. In the charter granted to the Penobscot River Railroad Go. we
find--”that a toll be, and is hereby granted and established---and at such rates as may be established from time to time, by
the directors of said corporation; provided that after 10 years
from the completion of said railroad, whenever the profits aris
ing from tolls or otherwise shall exceed the amount of 12 per cent
per annum on the actual cost of said railroad---- then the legislat
shall from time to time have the right to so reduce such tolls
as have been established, not below 12 per cent as aforesaid”
Maine Acts and Resolves Ch. Ill 1836

5

disregard, of the welfare of the local communities. The abuses that
developed, with this indiscriminate form of grant, especially in

street railway franchises, led to the granting of franchises by

r

municipalities, so that they might have control over their streets
From about 1860 to 1907 the cities became the chief franchise
granting bodies. The development of a means of positive public

utility regulation through the power granted to Public Service

Commissions marks the resumption by states of the authority over

public utilities,thus making the franchise questioh one of less
importance. Franchises are still required of public utility

corporations, but they need no longer to provide for all the
contingencies of the future, if state regulation is effective.

Regulation by means of the corporate charter proved very

ineffective, and many defects developed within this system of

regulation.
(a) While the setting of a maximum rate by the legislature
was provided for in the charter, this provision soon became inop

erative, for under the stimulus of competition rates were never

up to the maximum.
(b) It was assumed that all companies would voluntarily

fulfill their charter obligations, and so no effective means of

mandatory control over the actions of the companies were devised.
(c) The New England form of rate control which gave the

legislature power to revise rates when they exceeded, a certain per

cent of the investment, was very easily avoided by the simple
method of padding new investment accounts or a new issue of

6

capital stock, for there were no provisions for financial ancl
accounting control. Thus these regulatory provisions became in
effective and. gave the railroads a status comparable to the great

Land.' lords of the Feudal Ages, except that they had no King to
whom tojswear allegiance.

Judicially, charter regulation has been subject to many

interpretations of the delegated power of a corporate franchise
by a political body. At first the charter was considered, as a
special privilege conferred by a government upon particular

individuals or companies fortheir private profit. This concept of

a charter"is derived from English constitutional history and'is
associated with the monopolistic privileges granted by Queen
Elizabeth.,"^ *

In 1819 in the famous Dartmouth case the court held that
a charter was "a contract between the state and the grantee and
could not be impaired by subsequent enactments of the legislature^
Corporations under the protection of this decision "came to en

joy many special privileges, as exemption from taxation, regulat

ion or competition.’ When the harmful effects of the Dartmouth

decision became apparent to the states they sought a judicial
means of preserving their power of regulation and taxation.

The courts set up the doctrine that "the terms of any con
tract must be strictly construed, i.e., the abandoment of leg-

9. Glaeser, Martin G-., Outlines of Public Utility Economics,
The MacMillan Company, 1927 p. 205
10. Dartmouth College vs Woodward, 4 Wheaton 518 i
11. Glaeser., Outlines of Public Utility Economics p. 206

7

islative power must be expressly stated, and cannot be implied."
13
In the case of Charles River Bridge vs Warren Bridge ’the court

held that an express grant of power to build a toll bridge did not
also imply that the state might not subsequently charter a compet
ing bridge. Similarily it has been held that the grant of special

privileges is to the grantee alone and may not be transferred un14
less expressly permitted. ' Thus the concept that although a fran
chise is a contract, it^<apiy be altered or repealed if so stipulated
in the grant itself or in the laws of the state came into accepted

usage.
The movement for a more flexible form of regulation than

that offered by charters and sporadic boards of commissions, owes
its genesis to the decay of the laissez- faire doctrine, and the

special class of evils that became associated with the competit

ive regime.
The laissez-faire doctrine operated under the theory

that competition was the life of trade, and that such a system
would work fol? the best interests of the public. Under a system
of free competition no one would hinder anyone else from entering
or leaving a market; thus laissez-faire was correlated with lib

erty and the protection of property rights. Under the stimulus
of competition price would be measured by the cost of the product.

The theory of a "just or normal price" would work for the benefit
12. ibid. Also see State of Maine vs Maine Central Railroad 66
Maine 488, for an interpretation of a charter as a contract.
13. 11 Peters 420 (1837)
14. This is also discussed in 66 Maine 488 (see above 12.)

8

of the public, for if price went too high then competition would,

enter the market, supply would increase and demand decrease, hence
prices would go down. If, on the other hand, prices went too low,

then the reverse would take place. So cost would equal normal
price, which would be equal to justice.

The theory, however, did not work out thus in actual pract

ice, for it assumed that cost was the same to all enterprises,

C*

whereas there are differences in cost to differnt entreprenuers.

Again laissez-faire did not foresee that competition would lead
to monopoly or near monopoly, and thus disrupt the whole compet

itive schema, and in turn foster the evils of monopoly price, un
fair competition, discriminations, and rebating which relegated
public interest to a secondary position and put private interests

in the drivers seat.

The doctrine of a "just price" proved to be onlj^ja myth
t^a group of farmers in the Middle West when they felt that they
were being forced to pay exorbitant rates for the transportation
of their grain when the wheat market was low.

The reaction that set in to remove this special class of

abuses against public interests led to a wave of maximum rate regul

ation in the west and south, and finally culminated in the decision of Munn vs Illinois which upheld the constitutionality of a
state to prescribe a schedule of maximum rates for a business

affected with a public interest

9

In the Olcott case

15 •
’which paved the way for the Munn deois

ion the court said, "It Jias never beer considered a matter of any
importance that the road was built by the agency of a private

corporation. No matter who is the agent the function performed is
that of the state. Though the ownership is private the use is
public."

In the United States, judicial interpretation of public

utility regulation usually begins in 1877 with the Munn case,
thus placing it at the threshold of the period of positive pub
lic utility regulation. "They (the warehouses) stand, to use the

language of the consel, in ’the very gateway of commerce1 and
take toll from all who pass. Their business most certainly tenets

to a common charge and is a thing of common interest.and has
16
ceased to be juris privati only." ’ This mystical formula was

not penned by Justice Waite, , who wrote the decision of the case,

but was quoted from Lord Chief Justice Hale more than 200 years
before•

The court then, in justifying its decision in upholding the
right of the state to prescribe maximum rates looked to the comm

on law maxim of property, "that it shall not be used in a way in
jurious to the rights of others nor to impair the public rights."
The basis of public utility regulation is found in the

status of private property devoted to a public use. "The term

’private property’ is a misnomer. There is no strictly private
15. Olcott vs Supervisors 16 Wall. 695; 83 U.S. 678 (?)
16. Munn vs Illinois 94 U.S. 113

10.

interests in property enjoyed, to the complete exclusion of all
17
other interests.” Property may he viewed, as control over the behav

ior of others. There exists in property certain rights and. duties
which determine this behavior, either toward, a limitation of those

rights or toward, the exercising of the duties expressed in priv

ate property. In the feudal age private property meant use, en

joyment, and possession; buying, selling, and consumption were

not to be found in the definition of private property. To-day
property includes buying, selling/,; and. consumption, which leads
to price and incOfie, so that in a commercial age private proper

ty is associated with value.
Private property has developed from a physical to an in

tangible or valuation concept. Under the common law property was

associated with use-value. Property rights meant the of the phy

sical, tangible property for one’s own enjoyment. In the early

stage of public utility regulation, the judiciary concept of

private property was built around those doctrines that had devel
oped out of the common law, and extenuated by those doctrines

that developed under the system of laissez-faire, so that the dep

rivation of "property” without ”due process of law” referred to the

physical property being used by the corporation and not its
exchange value.
Exchange-value has come to mean not only the use and enjoy
ment of the property, but the right to fix a charge that will

yield an income. ”Not merely physical things are objects of prop17. Hartman, H.H., Fair Value, Houghton Mifflin Co. 1920 p.3.
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erty, 1-111 the expected earning power of those things are property;
and property is taken from the.owner, not merely under the power
of eminent domain which takes title and possession, hut under the

police power which takes its exchange value. To deprive the owners

of their exchange value is equivalent to depriving them of their
property."18•
It is this exchange value of property which has become

known as intangible property, and its value depends upon its right
of access to markets. If a corporation is barred from receiving

an income sufficient to enable it to realize a price on it in
the exchange market as a going concern, then all that the owner

has left is the title to the property, which means the actual

physical property, and this may be reduced to junk value.
Thus the destruction of property rights as now defined by
the courts, does not mean the destruction of the use, possession,
or enjoyment of the physical property, but means the destroying

of the

intangible rights of receiving an income, of having

bargaining power, of maintaining its exchange value on the buy

ing and selling market•
It has become a maxim in public utility regulation that

the power of rate regulation lies with the state legislature,
not with the judiciary. We have seen that the Munn vs Illinois

case arose over the questioning of the state legislature’s

right to prescribe maximum rates, because it was contrary to the
18. Commons, John R., Legal Foundations of Capitalism, The
MacMillan Co. 1924 p.16
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”due process of law” clause in the 14th amendment. In this case and

subsequent cases the Supreme Court of the United States has upheld

the constitutionality of the legislature to regulate rates where
the public has an interest in the business. ”In countries where the
common law prevails * it has been customary from time immemorial

for the legislature to declare what shall be a reasonable compen19
sation under such circumstances,”
and again ”of the propriety
of legislative interference within the scope of legislative pow20.
er, the legislature is the exclusive Judge.” Which grants un

conditionally to the legislature the power to regulate rates, a

point which since that time has never been disputed.

The extent of rate making power again arose in the case of
21.
the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railroad Co. vs Iowa, and in
22.
Tilly vs S.F. and W. Railroad Company. ’The decisions in these
cases were based on that of Munn vs Illinois which rejected the

principle of judicial review in the consideration of reasonable

ness of rates.
About a jiecade after the Munn case, the right of the judic
iary to review rate cases to ascertain their reasonableness arose
in a group of cases known as the Commission Cases. The emergence
of judicial review in rate cases placed a limitation upon the

power of the legislature to fix rates. The issue was first presented in the Stone vs Farmers1 Loan and Trust Company case, * in

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Munn vs Illinois 94 U.S. 113 C
ibid
94 U.S. 155 (
3
5 Fed.641 C
)
116 U.S. 307 /
1

13

which the court said, "from what has been thus said, it is not to
be inferred that this power of limitation or regulation is itself
without limit. This power to regulate is not a power to destroy

and limitation is not the equivalent of confiscation. Under pret/
ense of regulating fares and freight, the state cannot require a ?

railroad corporation to carry persons or property without reward;
neither can it do that which in law amounts to taking of private

property for public use without just compensation, or without

due process of law."
Subsequent cases

24

tended to more firmly intrench the con

cept that legislative power of regulation is subject to limitat
ion, and that limitation is the confiscatory analogy as applied
in the due process of law clause of the 14th Amendment to the

constitution of the United States.
Although there sprang up a widespread movement for the

establishment of commissions by the states, the movement did not
make a great deal of headway until about 1905. Due to the depress

ion of 1873 all the earlier commissions were repealed except that
of Illinois. With the establishment of the Interstate Commerce
Commission in 1887 the movement for fctate commissions was resumed,

and by means of new laws and successive amendments to old laws,
the movement for a strong type of commission continued unabated.

About 1905 another reform and expansion movement set in in
the movement for a strong public utilities commission. The earlier

24. Low vs Beidelman 125 U.S. 680, and Chicago, Milwaukee and
St. Paul Railroad Co. vs Minnesota 134 U.S. 418

14

type of commission held sway only over common carriers. The new

commissions as set up in Wisconsin and New York extended their

power over the electric railways, gas utilities, water utilities,
electric and power utilities, and telephone utilities.

Since then the movement for state commissions has spread
rapidly over the country, so that now in every state, except

Delaware, there exists some form of a state public service comm
ission looking to the public utility as a problem upon which

continuous attention must be bestowed.

15.
7

Valuation
For thirty years valuation methods hi

varied, interpretations, both by the
subject of public utility economics.

has arisen

in the attempt to establish a universal method of

valuation for public utilities is traced to a rather general
statement made in the United States Supreme Court decision of
Smyth vs Ames in 1898.

From the Munn vs Illinois decision in 1877, which first
upheld the state1s right to determine reasonableness of rates,
to the Smyth vs Ames decision no definite rule for determining

the reasonableness of rates had ever been brought into existence.
In the Ames case, however, the federal rule was enunciated that

the fair value of the property used. in|the

public service con

stituted the measure upon which a reasonable return could be

earned.
: The court then went on to lay down a criterion of reason

ableness; "And in order to ascertain that value, the original cost
of construction, the amount expended in permanent improvements,

the amount and market value of its bonds and stocks, the present
as compared with the original cost of construction, the probable

earning capacity under particular rates prescribed by statute,

and the sum required to meet operating expenses, are all matters
of consideration, and are to be given such weight as may be Just

and right in each case."1*

1. 169 U.S. 466, 546-547

16

Although this statement is too general to determine a method of

valuation due to much overlapping of some factors, and the in
clusion of many irrevelant factors that do not enter into fair
2.
value, three general methods have developed out of the struggle

to determine what is to be a fair value upon which a fair rate
of return is to be earned.

A.

Market Value.
One of the rules for determining fair value suggested in

the decision of Smyth vs Ames is the "market value of the out

standing stocks and bonds." Market value may be conceived in
two senses. First, it may mean as the rule states, the market

value of the securities of the public utility. The market value
as thus conceived is found by adding up

the value of the stocks

and bonds as registered on the stock and bond market. Market value

is also conceived as the capitalization of the net earnings of the

company at the prevailing rate of interest. Thus if the net
earnings of a company are $7,000 and the rate of return for
this particular utility is 7^, then the market value of the com
pany is $100,000.
The market value of stocks and bonds as registered on

the stock and bond market is untenable for rate making purposes,

for it represents too variable a factor. Stocks and bonds are

2. "The probable earning capacity of the company under the par
ticular rates prescribed by statute and the sum required to pay
operating expenses, are important categories in judging whether
the rates are adequate to earn a fair return on a fair value,
but do not enter into the determination of fair value itself."
Bauer, John, Effective Regulation of Public Utilities, The
MacMillan Company, 1925 p. 71

17

easily influenced by the conditions of trade, legislation, and

the temper of the buying public who may speculate in public

utility securities on the expectation of future earnings. Booms
and panics will cause wide fluctuations in the market value of

securities, so that the use of market value would necessitate
a continuous shifting of the rate base to meet the fluctuations
as shown by the stoc^nd bond market.

It has been claimed that "the market value represents the

crystallization of the best judgment of the market as to the
3.
value of the property." We are not interested, however, in det
ermining what a particular utility will sell for on the open

market as shown by its outstanding stocks and bonds, and that

added intangible asset we call "goodwill". We afe interested,
rather, in determining what shall be the rate base upon which

the utility is allowed by law to earn a "fair return"; and in
order to arrive at a rate base which shall be a "fair value",

we look to the cost of the investment to the owner, not the

repress

it as may be shown by its stocks

and boi

id bond market,

mings also means exchange value,
and her

a measure of fair value. The

seller

5 the full value of

and the

the future expected return on

3. Jone
Co. 192
Market
rate me

of Public Utilities, The MacMillan
n, however, do not believe that
a measure of fair value for

his property,

18

his investment. The public is not interested, in what the seller
may get for his property, or whether the buyer earns the return

that he expects on his investment; it is interested in securing
reasonable rates and. adequate service. "In attempting to promote

public good., even at the expense of private rights, we recognize
but two limitations, that imposed, by the 14th Amendment, and that

dictated by the necessity of attracting capital or abandoning
4e
private operation?
"In the case of competitive industries it is generally

held that the value of a business is chiefly determined by the

capitalization of its annual earnings, allowance being made for
the state of the money market at the time and the estimated

risk of the enterprise. Whatever the merits of this, the system
is certainly not applicable to the problem of valuing

public

enterprises for rate making purposes. For actiial or expected

earnings are largely dependant upon the rates that are^o be

set; and hence to determine rates bases upon a valuation based
on earnings is to become involved in a circle that has no end."

5•

If the exchange value is equal to the fair value of the
utility,then you will always get a fair rate of return on the

fair value of the property. Suppose for example that the net
earnings of an enterprise are $7,000 and the rate of return for
this particular utility is set at 7^>. Then the fair value and

the exchange value of this utility is $100,000. Now if the amount
4. Hartman, Fair Value, p. 86
5. Progress and Poverty in Current Literature on Valuation by
J.0. Bonbright, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Feb. 1926

19

of the return were reduced to $6,000 and 70 is still a fair rate oi

return, then the market value and the fair value of the property
would not be $100,000, but approximately $85,700. Now let us

suppose further that the fair value of this particular utility,
based on original cost of construction is found to be $100,000,
and the fair rate of return that’ this utility should earn is 70.

Thus itjis seen that the market value equals its original cost.
Let us further suppose that the fair value of this utility, based
on reproduction cost new basis is found to be $200,000. Then the

return at a fair rate of 70 would be $14,000.

Capitalizing

$14,660 at 70 would equal $200,000, so that the market value of
this utility is equal to its reproduction cost, which we have

assumed is its fair value.
Thus it follows that the exchange value of a public ut

ility is always equal to its "fair value", whether its rate base
be determined by its original cost of construction,ot reproduction

cost. The market value depends lipon the rate of return allowed

on the "fair value" of the utility.

B.

Original Cost.
The two most favored methods of valuation used to-day

are (1) original cost and (2) reproduction cost.

Original cost like market value is used in two senses.

The earlier concept of original cost meant the actual cost of the
property now employed for the public convenience; it is the orig

inal cost of the present property that is sought. To determine
the cost of the present property it is necessary first to make a

20

physical inventory of all the units of property. Having secured,
an inventory, the next step is to ascertain what these units cost
at the date of their construction or installation. The facts can
usually be found in the books of the company, but because many

companies were organized before any systematic accounting proced

ure came into use, it is not always possible to find all these
desired facts from the books of the company. In that ease it'ls
necessary to reach an approximation of the unit costs by refer

ence to price records and other data. Having determined the unit
prices to be used, it is next necessary to deduct from the total

inventory figure the depreciation on the property, for it is not

new and hence has been subject to wear and tear through use.
Finally certain costs which are not disclosed tn the physical

inventory m ust be allowed for. These intangible items are known

as overhead charges, and include organization expenses, engineer
ing and superintendence, taxes during construction, omissions
and contingencies, and cost of financing. The determination of

the cost of these overhead charges cause the major disputes in

valuation work. Everyone has his own concept of the relative

weight to be applied to these special items, and so it is hard
to reach an agreement.

Original cost is also conceived as the amount actually

invested in the enterprise from the beginning. This theory seekd
to determine the prudent or unimpaired investment in the enter
prise. The determination of the rate base under the prudent

21

investment theory is simply an accounting proposition.

The prudent investment theory has been developed by a
few individuals rather than by the courts. Dr. John Bauer and
Justice Brandeis are two of the leading authorities on the prud
ent investment theory, so that the following discussion will be

drawn rather liberally from their views.
"The prime requisite of a good rate base is that it shall
be fixed and def inite

’The investment is the amount of money

actually paid into the corporate treasury by the original pur
chasers of the corporate securities. It is this monetary capital

which, in their opinion, is placed at the service of the public,

and not the property which is purchased with this money.
’’The thing devoted by the investor to the public use is

not specific property, tangible and Intangible, but capital em
barked in the enterprise. Upon the capital so invested the Feder
al Constitution guarantees to the utility the opportunity to earn

a fair return. Thus, it sets the limit to the power of the state
to regulate rates. The constitution does not guarantee to the

utility the opportunity to earn?a return on the value of all
items of property used by the utility, or on any of them. The

several items of property constituting the utility, taken singly

and freed from the public use, may conceivably have an aggregate
value greater than if the items were used in combination. The owner

is at liberty, in the absence of controlling statutory provis
ions, to withdraw his property from the public service; and if

6. Bauer, Effective Regulation of Public Utilities p.104 ^7
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he does so, may obtain for it an exchange value---- • But so long

as the specific items of property are employed by the utility,
7
their exchange value is not of legal significance.” ’
As it is practically impossible to discover the actual

past investment for the majority of public utilities, the first

necessary step would be to make an appraisal of each company’s
property at the actual or reasonable cost of installation,
from which accrued depreciation would be deducted, and the final

result would be accepted as the net monetary investment in the

utility’s property unaffected by changes in the level of prices.

The figure would then have to be subject to adjustments
to meet any requirements as to the fair treatment of the common

stockholders. In the light of this

valuation, the books of the

company would be rewritten, and the results of the appraisal
shown in the accounts.

The initial rate base, once determined and

adjusted, would be fixed and unchanged for the future, and the
return would be based upon this initial figure, as found, plus
actual future investments; and all extensions and improvements

would be included in the accounts at actual cost under commission
supervision. ’’Under this procedure, there would be no question
at any time as to the amount on which the investors are entitled

to a return. Moreover, the rate base as thus determined, would be

coupled up consistently with the policy of charging depreciation
to operating expenses. There would be no possibility of giving

7. Dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis in Southwestern
Telephone case. 262 U.S. 276, 290 (1923)

the investors an advantage in accumulating an excessive depreciat
ion reserve, nor would the investors be penalized if for a short

period of time the reserves should be inadequate. The purpose

would be to eliminate any cause of dispute as to the amount of
the investment, the rights of the investors, and the obligations
o
of the consumer.” ’

0.

Reproduction Cost.

Reproduction cost like original cost and market value
is used in more than one sense. It is sometimes used to mean

the cost of reproducing the property on the assumption that the
property is new, and not depreciated. During a period of rising

price levels the value of the property, based upon this theory,

would be greatly appreciated. For this reason cost new basis is
greatly favored by the public utilities, but has been frowned on

by both the courts and public utility commissions. The death
blow to cost new basis was served in the decision of the City of
9.
Knoxville vs Knoxville Water Company , in which the court said,
"the cost of reproduction (new) is one way of ascertaining the

present fair value of a plant— but that test would lead to
obvious incorrect results, if the cost of reproduction is not

diminished by the depreciation which has come from use and age."
It is obvious that a cost new basis is wholly adverse
to the public interest theory, and so such a basis for fixing a

8. Bauer, Effective Regulation of Public Utilities p. 245
9. 212 U.S. 1,9 (1909)
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rate base<^y be dismissed without further consideration.*

Reproduction cost, as used in present valuation work,
means the cost of reproducing the property in its depreciated

condition. Reproduction cost less depreciation conveys differ

ent meanings to different people, because of the different means
employed to determine unit prices.
As in original cost it is first necessary to make an in

ventory of all the property used and useful in the public ser

vice, and then deduct the allowance made for depreciation. Be

sides the actual physical properties, working capital, materials

and supplies, etc. must be included in the inventory. The invent

ory having been made the question now arises as to what nn51
price is going to be employed. Are we to reproduce the property
at present prices of material, land, and labor, or at normal
prices measured over a five or ten year period preceeding the

valuation, or are we going to reproduce the property under the
actual conditions that existed when the property was constructed?

The law of the court has been that for the purpose of
fixing rates "the value of the property is to be determined as
of the time the inquiry is made. If the property which legally

enters into the consideration of the question of rates has in
creased in value since it was acquired, the company is entitled

10."Reproduction cost (new) has been pushed forward, mainly by
speculatively inclined corporation managers as a plausible
theory for determining ’fair value’- a plan which, if successful,
qould in these days of increasing prices, work out the most gigant
ic stock watering scheme ever devised by the ingenuity of man"
Andrews, V.W. The Utilities Magazine, 1, p.30 (1916)

25

to the benefit of such increase.”

11.
’And. again, ”the making of a

just return for the use of the property involves the recognition
of its Fair Value if it be more than its cost. The property,is

held in private ownership and it is that property, and not the

original cost of it, of which the owner may not be deprived without due process of law.” 12

While the court has held that present fair value is to be

determined by prices at the time the valuation is made, the
• more general mile is to use a normal cost basis measured over

a period of five or ten years. In the McCardle case, however,
the majority decision held for”spot” reproduction cost. That is,

the valuation should be based upon the prices of land, labor and
material, as of the time the inquiry was made. Justice Brandeis,

who wrote the dissenting opinion of this decision was opposed
to ”spot” reproduction on the grounds that ”the search for

fair value can hardly be aided by a hypothetical estimate of
the cost of replacing the plant at a particular moment, when

actual reproduction would require a period that must be meas
ured by years. "Spot” reproduction would be impossible of accom13.
plishment without the aid of Aladdin’s lamp.”

This case has tended to widen the breach between Comm

ission and Supreme Court interpretations of present value.

commissions have stressed the point that if present value is
11. Wilcox vs Co nsolidated Gas Co. 212 U.S. 19 (1909)
12. Minnesota Rate Case 230 U.S. 454 (1913)
13. Justice Brandeis, in his dissenting opinion in McCardle
vs Indianapolis Water Co. 272 U.S. 400,423-424 (1926)

The
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not measured by a normal cost basis the rate base will represent
an exaggerated figure. The court, in this particular case, how
ever, seems to have interpreted rather narrowly the decisions of
the Consolidated Gas case,

’and the Minnesota Rate case, ’ that

the value of the property is to be determined as of the time the
inquiry is to be made, and the company is to receive the benefits

of any increase in value that may have resulted due to an in

crease in the price level. This controversy between normal cost

basis and "spot” reproduction is still an unsettled issue and
may flame anew in the near future.
Reproduction cost must also take into consideration the
intangible properties which enter into the final cost of the

corporation as a going concern. These special items, such as
overhead charges, going value, franchise value, and working
capital, as in original cost, cause the greatest number of

disputes between the utility company and the commissioners in

arriving as a final figure based on reproduction cost.
The struggle in the search for a method of fair value
has been greatly hampered by what statisticians call a general

price level. The past forty years has seen many marked fluctu
ations in the general price level, and these fluctuating tend
encies have made themselves felt in the controversy between the

utilization of the original cost theory as against the reprod

uction cost theory as a measure of fair value.
Following the Civil War prices declined steadily until
14. See supra 11, p.25
15. See supra 12, p.25
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about 1900, so that the Smyth vs Ames decision of 1898 which

first advanced the doctrine of a "fair return on a fair value"
came in the very trough of the price level, as may be seen from

the graphical representation of public utility regulation and
the changing price level, on the opposite page.
In this case (Smyth vs Ames) the railroad argued for the

investment in terms of securities as the basis upon which rates

should be determined. The State of Nebraska argued for reprod

uction cost. The court in its decision decided for neither the
one or the other basis, but rendered a Solomonic judgment by
enumerating several factors that should be given due consider

ation in determining the "fair value of the property used and

useful in the service of the public."
This opposition of views continued until about 1910,
when these contradictory views swapped hands, so to speak. The

public utilities agreed to reproduction basis as a measure of
fair value, but the public now began to argue for the original

cost basis in valuation work. Now (1932) all indications point
to another change in views regarding the method to be employed

in determining what is the fair value of a public utility,

These periodic changes in views as to what shall be the
measure of the rate base may be explained by both the price-level and the conflict between public welfare and private interests.
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With a steady declining price-level as was the situation
from 1865 to 1900, the utilties naturally looked to the orig

inal cost of construction as the fair measure for a rate base,
for the properties had been constructed and developed during a

period when prices were high. To base the valuation on anything
but this basis would give them such a low valuation that they

would be unable to earn the reasonable return necessary to pay
their fixed charges, and to attract sufficient capital to prov
ide for improvements and replacements • In other words it would
lead to confiscation of property contrary to the Tdue process

of law1 clause of the 14th Amendment. The public, on the other

hand, looking to cheaper rates, argued that the'utilties were

entitled only to a fair return on the property used and useful
for the convenience of the public, and that the property should

be valu*,ed on the cost of reproducing it at the present day
cost of materials and labor. The public also argued that the
original cost of construction figure was too high because the

railroads especially, had secured their land free by liberal

land grants, and that the capital stock contained much water

and was no evidence of the true cost of original construction.
With the upturn of the price level from 1900 to 1921,
during which occured the great upheavel in prices due to the
World War, the public utilities from 1910 looked to the re

production cost as the measure of fair value. If they (the
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public utilities) were to continue giving service to the public,
then their rate base must be increased, for during a period when
the price of materials and labor was abnormally high, the rate

of return must be in accord with this increase in the cost of
service or else their financial stability would be undermined

and the confiscation of their property vzould result.

With the present day decline in prices a new situation
14.
arises. In the O’Fallon case
the railroads won their fight for
reproduction cost when the Supreme Court of the United States

decreed that the Interstate Commerce Commission did not give
sufficient allowance for reproduction cost. At the recent House

Committee hearing on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on the
proposed repeal of the recapture clause of the Transportation

Act

of 1920, which was passed to act as a check on inflated

capitalization of railroads, it was stated that the railroads,

due to the decline in prices since the O’Fallon decision, no
longer seem to care to stress the elements of reproduction cost
and are now turning to original cost as the measure of fair valued
What the future holds for valuation is hard to say, but

it will be of interest to see whether the courts will continue

to hold for the reproduction cost basis, or will swing over to
the original cost as a basis of determining fair value. If this

conjecture should actually result, then it would seem that the
14. St. Louis and O’Fallon Railroad Company vs Interstate Comm
erce Commission 279 U.S. 461 (1929)
15. See Article "Valuation Again” in Hew York Times, Sunday
Feb. 21, Financial Section 6n
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public always stands to lose and the utilities to gain in the
controversy over the measure for fair value. It is a poor theory

that does not work both ways. Perhaps the trouble is with the
theory, not the failure in developing a consistent policy, and
we should look for a more equitable measure of fair value, un

influenced by a changing pri^e level.

31.

A Survey of Public Utility Regulation in Maine

A. Prior to 1914
It is customary to speak of regulation by statd commiss

ioners as beginning about 1905. This date is often denoted as
the dividing line between laissez-faire economics and the period
of positive public utility regulation. The Granger reaction

which began with legislation to prescribe maximum rates and

fares and prohibit discrimination is regarded as the initiating

factor in the gradual development of a strong and comprehensive
form of state commissions looking to the regulation of that field
of economic enterprise which to-day we term ’’Public Utilities” .

Historically this view is inaccurate, because the commiss
ion as an agent of regulation had been developed and was in use
in Maine and other New England states long before the drums that
roused the grangers to action had ever been heard on the wind.
Railroads, because of their business of a common carrier,

almost from the first were singled out as being affected with a

public interest. Such early supervisory control as was exercised
by the legislature did not look to the economic phases of regulat
ion, but was confined to a much narrower scope, that of regulation

in behalf of the public health and safety.
A survey of regulation in Maine, prior to 1914, leads us

into two fields of regulatory endeavor, both having their individ

ual and concomitant aspects. These two devices of regulation

were (1) regulation by means of the corporate franchise, and (2)
regulation by the Board of Railroad Commissioners.

Franchises were granted under the general law by the legis

lature, and were known as general franchises; or by special leg
islation, and thus became known as special franchises. The general

franchise was the type of franchise usually granted to steam
railroads, while the specia^franchises were granted by municipal

ities, through the legislature, to street railroads in order

that they might exercise control over the use of their streets.
The General Franchise

To avdid the binding effects of the Dartmouth decision
1.
of 1819 which declared a franchise to be a contract between
the state and the corporation which could not be impaired by

further legislative enactments, the State of Maine in 1831,

passed a law "that all acts of incorporation which shall be

passed after the passage of this act, shall, at all times here

after, be liable to be amended, altered, or repealed at the

pleasure of the legislature, in the same manner as if an express
provision to that effect were therein contained; unless there

shall have been inserted in such act of incorporation an express
2•
limitation or provision to the contrary."
The general

franchise granted by the Maine Legislature

typifies the New England form of franchise which is distinctly
different from the franchises granted to corporations in other
1. See above p.6
2. Maine Laws, Vol.Ill 1831 Ch.503
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sections of the country.
The rate of t611 that a railroad might charge was left
to the discretion of the company. It was provided, however, that

after a period of years, usually ten, from the time of the com
pletion of the road, and anytime thereafter the rates of toll would
be subject to be altered and regulated at the pleasure of the

legislature. Many franchises contained the provision that after

a period of ten years or more from the date of the completion of

the road, and any time thereafter, whenever the profits arising
from tolls exceeded a certain percentage per annum on the actual

cost of the railroad, then the legislature has the right to reduce

the established tolls, but not below the specified percentage of
return. (The specified percentage of profits per annum to be

allowed was usually between 10 percent and 12 percent)

It is interesting to note that in 1874 the state passed
an act imposing a tax of li percent on the value of the corpor-

ate franchise. ’The value of the franchise was determined by

deducting from the market value of the stock the assessed value

of the real estate taxed by the cities and towns.
The Maine Central Railroad refused to pay the tax, claim
ing that it was a violation of the original charter, and that
these charters were contracts between the state and the railroad

company which could not be changed. The railroad further claimed

that when the net income exceeds ten percent of the cost, the
legislature can take for the state any portion of the excess and

3. Maine Acts and Resolves 1874 Ch. 258
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that no other tax shall ever be assessed on the corporation or
on any of its priveleges or franchises, but when the levying of

the tax causes the net income to fall below ten percent then it
is a breach of the contract.
The case went to the Maine Supreme Court, which upheld

the power of the state to levy the tax. The Court in granting
its decision said, "When two or more corporations with a special
immunity from general taxation---- , are incorporated into a new

corporation which is unable, and is not required, to do or perform

the acts which must precede such special taxation, the new corp
oration as thus created cannot claim the special immunity belong

ing to the corporation out of which it was composed---- That, as
4.
such new corporations, they are subject to the law of 1831
which has continued in force to the present time, and consequently
5
they are liable to taxation." *
The franchise also specified the course that the rail

road was to follow and gave the corporation the power of eminent

domain.
While the capitalization of the corporation was provided

for in the franchise, the amount and par value of the capital
stock contained therein was not inserted by the legislature, but

by the corporation. That is, while the charter might state that
the capital stock was to be say, $100,000 or not less than $1,000

or more than $100,000, as it was sometimes stated, this amount
4. See above p.33,for a full statement bf this law.
5. 66 Maine 488,514
)
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was fixed at the first meeting of the incorporators, and not by
the legislature. This is provided for under the general corporat
ion law. The Maine Supreme Court has held that "if a legislative /

charter does not fix the number of shares of the capital stock,
it is presumed that the legislature intended that the stockholders
6.
or directors should fix the number? and again, "the legislature

has not retained the power to determine the number of shares nor
7.
bestowed it upon anyone else---- . The corporation alone can do it".

If the amount of capital stock originally contained in the charter
was insufficient to carry out the corporate purposes, the corpor

ation would ask to have the charter amended, but the amount of

the increase was determined at a meeting of the stockholders duly
called for that purpose, and not hy the legislature.
Under this system no protection was given to the investors
from stock watering. The amount of capital stock stipulated in

the franchise might be in excess of what was needed to carry on

construction work, and there was nothing to prevent the directors
from watering the Remaining amount if they desired to do so.

Bonds might be issued, but not above the amount of ce/pital
stock paid in to the corporation, secured in any manner the

directors deemed expedient. The par value was fixed, usually at
$50 or $100, and the rate of interest was not to be over 6 percent.
6. In re Somerset and Kennebec Railroad Co. 45 Me. 524 (1860^
7. ibid
’ p
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The Special Franchise
The charter granted to the Augusta ard Hallowell Railroad
8.
Company in 1868 typifies the charters granted to municipalities
and public utilities by special acts of the legislature.

The charter granted the company permission to use the

streets with the restriction that the location should "from time
to time be fixed and determined by the municipal officers---- and
assented to in writing by said corporation." 9 * The rate of toll
to be charged was left to the discretion of the company. In
some instances, however, the franchise contained the schedule
of tolls that the company was to charge.^‘The franchise was

limited as to duration. The original location d>f the route was
to run for 25 years. At the expiration of the life of the chart

er it might be renewed from time to time for a term not exceed
ing 25 years at one time, by the municipal officers.

The municipal officers of the cities of Augusta and Hallow

ell were given power at all times to regulate the rate of speed,
the mode and use of the tracks, to make provisions for

the remov

al of snow and ice from the streets, roads and highways of the com

pany at its expense; also to see that the company kept in repair

the portions of the streets occupied by the railroadTs tracks,
within the limits of the city. The provisions regarding capitaliz

ation for the company were similiar to those contained in the
general franchise.
Maine Acts and Eesolves 1868 ch. 450
10.See Franchise of Waterville and Fairfield R.R. Co. Maine Acts
and Resolves 1835 ch.611
9 . ibid sec. 1
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An analysis of these two types of franchises, the general
and the special, show that the former were subject to more reg

ulation of rates and profits than the latter, while in the manner
of service and location, the special franchises were subject to

a much wider range of regulation. Neither type exercised any con

trol over securities, for as we have seen above, the legislature

had never retained the power to determine the number of shares

that a corporation might issue, nor had it bestowed this power
upon anyone else.

This absence of control over security issues made the
franchise regulation of rates and profits ineffective, for the
corporation could always pad its investment accounts to show that
it was earning only the amount of return stipulated in the fran
chise. It wasregulation by the special franchise that gave chart

er regulation its significance, but as seen, this regulation was
limited to a narrow scope, that of service, location, and any

thing else that the cities could get out of the utilities in the

form of free passes to police, reduced fares to school children,
street pavements, or a corporation tax, usually a per cent of the
gross earnings.
The Board of Railroad Commissioners

The first attempt at any form of regulatory machinery over

public utilities, in Maine, was the formation of the Board of
Railroad Commissioners in 1858.This was merely an act to sec-

11. Maine Acts and Resolves 1858 ch.36
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ure the safety and convenience of travelers on the railroads9.The
act provided, that ”the governor, with the advice of the council

shall appoint three railroad commissioners to act as a board, and
to hold office for three years.” 12 ’ Two of the commissioners were

to be experienced in the operation and management of railroads,
and. one was to be experienced In the construction of railroads.

Their compensation was to be five dollars a day while actually
employed in their official duties, to be paid by the railroads
on which the services were rendered. Later the act stipulated

that one of the commissioners was to be learned in lav; and was
to act as chairman. It was to have an expense account of $3200

a year to provide for maps, reports, and stationary; to pay
stenographers, and to hire mechanical engineers to test bridges. 13

The commission was to have authority ■fro^examine into the

condition of railroads in the state, their rate of speed, their

rolling stock, time tables, the times and terms of connection and
junction or crossing, and the rates at which passengers and mer

chandize, coming from one road are transported over another; to
the end that the public safety and convenience in the transportation might be provided for and secured. 14 *
In 1874 Governor Dingley, in his address to the legislature,

recognized the limitations of the power of the railroad commission
when he said,”In authorizing the formation of railroad corporations
hereafter,---- care should, be taken to include such provisions as

12.ibid sec.l
13. Revised Statutes 1903 ch.51 sec 48
14. Acts and Resolves 1858 ch 36 sec.2
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will remove all doubts as to the right of the state to exercise

such supervision as the public interest may require. Existing

laws, as it seems to me, fail to confer upon the railroad commission powers which are essential to secure the convenience, even
if they do the safety of the public".

From time t© time the power of the commission was extend

ed and added to by successive legislative enactments. In 1874
it was provided that the railroads were to make an annual report
to the commission, and the report was to include amo^&ig other

things, the length of the road, capital sto«k, whole cost of
the road, amount and nature of its indebtedness and dues, whole

cost of operating, average number of tons of freight per train,
whole number of stockholders, and the amount of each dividend

and when paid. (Acts and Resolves 1878 ch.218) In 1877 it was
provided that the railroad commission should provide a form of
return uniform for all railroads in the state. The form of

return was designed to produce uniformity in the annual rail

road returns of all railroads in New England. (Acts and Resolves
1877 ch.207) And again in in 1891 it was provided that the form
of return should be the same as that required by the Interstate

Commerce Commission. (Acts and Resolves 1891 ch.6) In 1899 the
authority of the commission was extended to act upon

petitions

of extensions of railroad lines,(Acts and Resolves 1899 chf71),

and in the same year the power to act upon a petition for approv
al for

the location of railroads was added to their

15. Maine Acts and Resolves 1874 Governor’s Address.
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duties, (ch.117) These extensions of power conferred on the

commission did not have any mention of regulation over securities,
valuation or rates, "but were merely amendments to the act of

1858 to provide for the safety and convenience of passengers on
railroads. The requirement for a uniform annual report by the

railroads may be viewed aa an important piece of legislation in

that it tended to keep the accounts of the railroads in good

order, which facilitates the work of the public utilities comm
ission of to-day in their valuation work.
It has been said that "the regulation of security

issues forms the very cornerstone of public regulation. The
theory and :policy of regulation follow from, and are based upon,

the regulation of security issues. The control of capitalization
is highly desirable, if not an indispensable , concomitant of
governmental regulation of the operations and charges of public
16.
service corporations”.
With this thought in mind we might well inquire into the

nature and extent of security regulation in Maine prior to 1914,

either by means of the corporate franchise and general laws, or
as shown in the power invested in the early railroad commission,
by the state legislature.

In our discussion above of security regulation by means
of the corporate charter we noted that the legislature exercised

no continuous control over corporate securities. The stockholders

16. Bullock, Control of Capitalization of Public Service Corp
orations of Massachusetts. Publications of the American Economic
Association 3rd series x (1909) p.384
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decided on the amount of the capital stock to be issued, and the

directors used the funds paid in for these securities for any
purpose they deemed expedient or not expedient as the case may

have been. To find any positive attempt on the part of the legis
lature to regulate security issues we must look at two laws, one

passed in 1897, and the other in 1901, which were designed to
place some measure of control over the issuance of capital stock,
hitherto non-existant.

The law of 1897

’provided that an increase in capital

stock must be for some lawful purpose, such as the building of a
branch railroad track, to aid in the construction of another
railroad, for the building of stations, for making permanent

improvements, for paying its funded debt, or for paying its

floating debt. The increase however, must first be authorized

by a vote of the majority of the stock present or represented,
at a legal meeting of the corporation called for that purpose.

The directors of the corporation must then petition the rail

road commision for the increase, who were then to file a certif
icate in the office of the Secretary of State showing th^ amount

of the increase authorized and the purpose for which the proceeds
from the sale of stock were to be used. The corporation was for

bidden to use the proceeds for any purpose not specified, in the
certificate, and if they did so were to be enjoined from so doing
by an application from the Board of Railroad Commissioners or

any interested party,
Maine Acts and Resolves 1897 ch. 186
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In 1901 additional control over securities was provided.

18

This act provided that when the capital stock of a railroad corp

oration was increased it was to be offered first to the stock

holders in proportion to the amount of stock they owned. If the
stock was not taken within fifteen days of the pu blished notice
regarding the increase, then the unsubscribed for stock was to
be sold by the directors of the corporation at auction. The time

and place of the auction were to be prescribed by the railroad
commission. Ko shares "were to be issued or sold for a less sum, to
be actually paid in cash, than the par value thereof". If, however,

the incr^se did not exceed 4 per cent of the existing capital
stock, then the directors did not first have to offer the same
to the stockholders but might proceed to sell it at auction.

The issuance of bonds was not subject to a very wide
range of regulation. The corporate franchise usually specified

the amount and par value of the bonds, the relation of bonded

indebtedness to capital stock, the rate of interest, and in

some instances the maturity of the issue. It was provider by
statute that bonds might be issued and sold at sums not less than

$100, bearing interest at not over 6 per cent, to be secured in

such manner as the directors deemed expedient, and "binding on
it though sold at less than par value”.

19

These laws of 1897 and 1901 not only recognized the prev18. Maine Acts and Resolves 1901 ch. 173
19. Revised Statutes 1871 ch. 51 sec.28
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ions limitation on security regulation but provided, a means of >

securing more continuous attention to new issues of capital stock,
and thus protected more fully the interest of the investor. Any
interest that the public might have

in securing additional control

over securities, however, was of a minor consideration. People
were still living under the laissez-faire system, and while they

had been granted some interests in the affairs of a public util

ity, they had not been granted the right to inquire into all
phases of its operation. The intent of these laws seems to have
been to affect control over the disposal of the securities in the

interest of the investor, and not the amount of the issue which
would be the primary interest of the public. While these laws
defined the method by which these new issued of securities were
to be disposed of, and made it encumbent upon the commission to
see that the funds realized from the sale of these securities

were used only for the lawful purposes enumerated in their petit

ion, it failed to define any principles that would guide the

commission in deciding whether or not the issue should be auth
orized. The only means that the commission had of determining the

financial structure of the railroad was through the reports which,
from 1877, the railroads had been required to submit annually.

These reports might or might not show the equity in the corporat
ion upon which the new issue of securities was to be issued. So
for this reason, security issues, while they did become subject
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to some continuous and systematic control, were not entirely

sufficiently or effectively regulated.

The Board of Railroad Commissioners was never an
effective regulatory machine. It was merely a fact finding comm

ission with powers to investigate into the affairs of railroads
and make recommendations. It had no power to enforce its orders
except through the general court, a cumbersome and ineffective

procedure. Its jurisdiction extended only to railroads, and its

maimpurpose was to secure the safety and convenience of passeng
ers on the railroads. It had no jurisdiction over the rates which
a railroad might charge. The greater part of its efforts were

spent in the inspection of the physical properties of the rail

road, deciding on new locations, the investigation of accidents,
discriminations, and rebating, and it was usually hampered in
this work by the lack of financial resources,

probably the two

most important powers conferred upon this commission,in the light
of present day regulation, was that of requiring the railroads
to submit uniform annual returns, and that of supervising the

disposal of new issues of corporate securities. When this board
went out of office in 1914 it was still a fact finding commission

to secur^jthe safety and convenience of passengers on railroads.
Thus the scope of the Board of Railroad Commissioners was never

extended beyond the narrow field of regulation in behalf of
public health and safety•
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Regulation of other Utilities
The regulation of gas and. electrio&l companies, telephone

and. telegraph companies, and. water companies, utilities which

to-day receive the greatest amount of attention by the public
utilties commission were, before 1914, subject to no other regulat
ory provisions than those provided. for in the corporate franchise
and a few statutory enactments. Most of these utilities are

comparatively ndw to society, and their greatest growth has come

during the past twenty years.
- In 1901 the legislature recognized, in part, the monopol
istic character of gas and electrical companies when it decreed

that, "no corporation so organized, shall have authority without

special act of the legislature, to make, generate, sell, distrib

ute, or supply gas or electricity or both, for any purpose, in
or to any city or town, in or to which another company, person
or firm are making, generating, selling, distributing, or supply

ing, or are authorized to make, sell, generate, distribute or
20 •
supply gas or electricity or both."

From a study of the franchises granted to these utilities
we find that they were essentially the same as those granted to

street railways. The regulatory provisions of these franchises
were those pertaining t*o the use of the streets of the city or

town within which the corporation was carrying on its business.
20. Maine Acts and Resolves 1901 ch. 273
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The utility company might lay lines of wire upon, under, or over

a street, hut only under the direction of the municipal officers;
pipes and. acqueducts might be laid down subject to the restrict

ions imposed by municipal officers. They were given the right to
hold real and personal estate, but only up to a fixed maximum

value. It was not unusual for the utility to make contracts with

the city, townspeople, or any other corporation withili the city
or town for the supplying of service. In many instances because
of favorable contracts between the utility and the city, the

utilities were granted certain tax exemptions.

The franchise

usually provided that after a period of years the town or city
might purchase the property of the corporation at a price deter

mined by a commission of three uninterested persons, but the
price was not to be below its actual cost. This statement though,

unless there existed a close supervision over the accounts of the

company by the municipality, did not mean much. Private corporat
ions through the use of construction companies and other promot

ion schemes usually showed on their books construction cost figures

much in excess of the actual investment in the utility.

The corp

oration knowing that at some future date the municipality might
take over the utility could, by covering up its original accounts

and showing on its books much higher cost figures, dispose of

its properties at a handsome profit.

The Maine Supreme Court in determining the sale price of a

water utility based their decision on a substitute plant theory.
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nWe think the inquiry along the line of reproduction should,
however, be limited to the replacing of the present system by

one substantially like it. To enter upon a comparison of differ

ent systems— to compare this one with more modern systems-----would be to open a wide door to speculative inquiry, and lead to

discussions not germane to the subject. It is this system that is
to be appraised, in its present condition and with its present
efficiency.”

The rates of toll to be charged wereUeft to the discretion

of the company. The provisions relating to capitalization were
similiar to those franchises granted to street railroads.
Franchises granted to water companies between 1903 and

1913 offer an exception to the typical public utility franchise
discussed above. Some seventeen franchises were granted between

these dates and all lay down a definite rule as to the amount of

return that a water company was to earn. The rates were to be so
established as to provide revenue for the following purposes:
1. To pay all operating expenses of the water system.

2. To provide for the payment of the interest on the indebt
edness of the company.

3. To provide a sum equal to not less than one half of
one per cent nor more than five per cent of the entire indebted

ness, which sum shall be turned into a sinking fund to provide
for the extinguishment of the indebtedness.
21. Kennebec Water District vs City of Waterville 97 Me. 185 (1902)
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Thus we find that previous to 1914 the only regulation

that this large group of public utilities were subject to were

such regulatory provisions as were contained in the corporate
franchise or might be enacted by municipal ordinances, and these

regulations only referred to the use of the streets of the city
or the public highway. With the exception of the water districts

no utility was regulated as to the rate it might charge. These

utilities had been granted monopolistic priveleges, but the
state had not as yet embarked upon a program of effective pub

lic utility regulation.
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B. Regulation Under the Maine Public Utilities Commission
The movement that was spread-ing from state to state from
1905 for the establishment of a strong type of Public Utilities

commission saw the seeds for s^ch a commission in Maine sown
in 1909, when two bills with that end in view were introduced

into the legislative session of tha^year, one in the senate

by Carl E. Milliken, and the other in the house by Howard
Davies. The one by Mr. Davies proposed to change the name of the

railroad commission to a Public Service Commission and to ex

tend its powers over street railroads, gas plants, electrical
plants, telephone, telegraph and express companies.^• "The

bill was given a lengthy hearing before the Judiciary committee,
which recommended that it be referred^to the next legislature

•

A new bill creating a Public Utilities Commission was
introduced into the house in 1911 by Mr. William R. Pattangal,

but it was voted to refer it to the next legislature, because
the importance of the bill warranted a more thorough consideration

In 1913 Governor Haines in his inaugural message paved

the way for the passage of a public utilities act, when he
recognized the necessity df establishing a more effective means
of regulating these utilities which had had conferred upon them

monopolistic priveleges. "We hear little complaint df disregard

of public rights, yet we hear some; and there is a good deal of
discussion about the subject; and a notable unrest and dissatis1. Legislative Record 1909 p.489
2. Oren C. Hormell, Maine Public Utilities, Bowdoin College
Bulletin February 1927 p. 39
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faction arising from the fact that they are not subject to a
stricter control Ind. regulation. In all the private affairs of

men we are accustomed, to say that it takes two to make a trade,

but not so with the busihess of the public service companies.
These companies ads a rule make their own prices and. formulate
their own service and. the public can take it or leave it as
they please on these terms and. conditions. V/hile our statute con
templates some regulation in some cases in these matters, and the

common law undoubtedly clothes our court with such authority,

yet there is no easy and practical way for the average citizen
to get at this situation; and the public seems to feel that

such a means should be provided. I believe that the time has

come, both in the interest of the public service companies and

the public to be served by them, when a public service commiss
ion should be established for this purpose.
Thus it seems that while the public utility question was

not a burning issue to the citizenry of Maine, yet public opin-

ion seemed to*'’viewed, the whole question in a rational manner,
and felt that a more effective means of public utility regulation

should be provided.
The public utilities bill as drawn up and presented to
the 76th Legislature was substantially the Wheeler draft of the
Wisconsin law. It was, however, amended and remodeled in some

3. Maine Acts and Resolves 1913 p. 1092
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instances so as to better meet the needs of Maine, The bill was

passed without opposition, although Senator Hersey stated that
plenty of opposition would, be given to stop it, for he knew that

there was a great pressure in the lobby to defeat the bill.4.

The bill was signed by Governor Haines March 22, 1913.
The act, however, did not take effect until November 1,
1914 because petitions, asking that the matter be referred to a

vote of the people, were circulated throughout the state, and

the necessary 12,000 signatures were obtained before ninety
days had elapsed between the signing of the act and the date

it was to go into effect.
The bill was referred to the people at the regular state

election in 1914 and was passed by a large majority of votes.
A survey of regulation under the Public Utilities Commiss

ion will be discussed, undef^the following headings: (1) organiza
tion (2) jurisdiction (3) accounts and reports (4) control over

security issues, and (5) regulation of rates and service.

1. Organization
The Maine Public Utilities Commission is composed of
three members who are appointed by the Governor with the advice
and consent of the Council and hold office for seven years.

The law provides tha.t the chairman shall receive $5,000
for salary, and the other two commissioners shall receive $4,500;

4. Bangor Daily News March 16, 1913
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the clerk is to receive $2,500 and the assistant clerk $1,500.

The commission is authorized to to appoint a clerk, an
5
assistant clerk, an inspector of utilities, ’and "such expert,
professional and other assistance as is necessary" for the per-

forming of. the work of the commission. ’ The members of the comm
ission and their staff are forbidden to have any pecuniary inter
est in any public utility operating within the state; to hold
any other civil office of profit or trust under the Government

of the United States or of this state except that of justice of

the peace and notary Public; to serve on or under any committee
of any political party.
A comparison of the salaries of the commission and staff

in 1915 and 1920 is presented below:
1915
$14,000

commissioners

1930
$14,000

clerk

4,000*

3,250

accountant

1,890.87

4,816.57

chief of rates

1,700

2,750

engineers and assistants

4,953.33

5,037.76

inspectors

890.32

4,775

official reporter

679.57

2,100

assistant reporter
office stenographers

steamboat inspector

1,590
2,537.11

$30,651.20
* clerk and assistant

Maine Acts and Resolves 1913 ch ,129 sec.l
6. ibid sec.3
7. ibid sec. 2

6,496.50
1,188
$46, 603.83
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An analysis of these two comparative statements shows that

the salaries of the commission and staff have increased by about
$15,000 in fifteen years. This increase has applied only to the

staff of the commission. Because of the many new duties which
have been delegated to the commission, and which are largely
clerical in nature, it has been necessary for the commission to

increase its personnel. The salaries paid to the commissioners,

however, have remained unchanged during the sixteen years of
its existence, although its commissional duties have increased

greatly, both through new legislation and the general business

conditions of to-day when commission supervision over public
utilities must be more continuous.
Pro£/essor Hormell of Bowdoin, in his study of Maine
o
Public Utilities, points out that this policy of economy as it

is applied to the public utilities commission is extremely short
sighted if not actually disastrous, for many young men of excell

ent ability in the field of engineering and accounting accept
these low salaried positions for a few years and then move on
to accept larger salaries from utility companies and private

industries.
When we consider that the effectiveness of regulation

by state commissioners depends upon the ability and training of
the commissioners, then these criticisms as pointed out are of

vital importance both to the utilities and to the public. Not

8. Hormell, Orren Chalmer, Maine Public Utilities, p. 46
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only must a commission give continuous attention to the problems

of the public utilities, but its decisions must be bom of a

scientific technique and a judicial tradition
ion by a commission is to be effective, and reflect the interest
of both the utility and the public.

2. Jurisdiction

By the Public Utility Act of 1913 the commission was vested
with power to regulate every public utility in the state. "The

term ’public utility’ includes every common carrier, gas company,
electrical company, telephone company, telegraph company, whar-

finger and warehouse man".
In 1921^0‘the jurisdiction of the commission was extended
to include jitneys used for hire, provided that they are operated

over regular routes between pdints in this state. The regulation

of jitneys is of great Importance because of its competition
with steam railroads and street and interurban railways.
In refusing to grant the application of the Maine Motor

Goaches Inc. for permission to establish a system of motor buses

within the state the commission believed that such a system,
paralleling the lines of existing steam and electrical railroads
would be of a destructive nature to the existing common carriers.

"The objective to be sought---- is a coordination of public automob
ile service with that of the steam railroads, and with such of
9. Maine Acts and Resolves 1913 ch.129 sec.9
10. "
"
"
"
1921 ch.184

55

the electrical railways and street railways as will lend themselves

to such coordinate service".And again "competition which

brings life and force and incentive to odinary industry cannot
truthfully be said to be invariably desirable in the conduct of
public utilities which in their nature,, although owned by individ

uals, are dedicated to the use of all the citizens of the com*-'
munity and governed in many ways by the state itself. Public

utilities' must of necessity be limited in number in any given
community in order to be at all renumerative and hence able to

attract capital for maintenance and development. This has been

recognized as the policy of this state since the enactment of
the public utility law in 1914 when the state assumed to regulate

the rate of return which such utilities may earn upon the prop
erty devoted to the service of the public. There may be exigen

cies when competition must be the exception to the rule, for
industry must not wither by the slothful enterprise of those

controlling existing utilities". •
13.
In 1923
the jurisdiction of the commission encompassed
the operations of steamboats and motorboats engaged in inland
navigation. The work attached to this duty is mostly clerical in

nature, that of issuing certificates of reinstation to the owners
of these vessels engaged in inland navigation.

11. Public Utility
12. In re Portland
Annotated 1923
1925 B. 357
13. Maine Acts And

Reports Annotated 1926 B. 545,553
Taxicab Co. (Maine) Public Utility Reports
E. 772; in re Weiner (Maine) P.U.R. Annotated
Resolves 1923 ch. 149
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Under the franchise form of regulation, the municipalities
were granted a large measure of regulatory supervision over util

ities operating within their jurisdiction. The formation of the
public utilities commission

deprived cities and towns of much

of their power of regulation. One of the most important en

croachments on the regulatory power of the municipalities by the

commission has been in regard to contracts between the municip
ality and the utility.
The most important of these "contract” decisions rendered

by the commission, and later upheld by the Maine Supreme Court,
were the"Lincoln Group” of water cases.
By the terms of the franchises, water companies were allow

ed to contract with towns, cities, and individuals for the

supplying of services. In the public utility act, there was

inserted a provision that all contracts were to be filed with

the commission. An investigation of these contracts, especially
during 1918 and 1919 when utilities were asking for increased
rates, disclosed the fact that if the present contracts were

to remain in effect it would lead to gross discriminations

between those who had entered into the contract and those who
had not contracted for the services of the utility. That is:,

under the increased rate provisions, the non-contracting party

would have to pay more than its fair share of the increased
cost of operation.
In 1919 the commission rendered its decision in regard to
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contracts "between utilities and those whom it served in the

Lincoln Water Company Case.

’ In deciding on this case the comm

ission had to (1) define the extent of the jurisdiction of the
public utilities commission over rates; (2) decide whether or not

the state had divested itself of its police power by the terms

of the franchise and (3) to determine whether or not the state
had

exempted contract rates from the operation of the public

utilities commission.
The commission sumed up these three points in the follow

ing arguments:

"We started

with the proposition that the state has

plenary power to regulate all quasi-municipal corporations, after,
as well^s, before their organization, in the exercise of their
public functions. The fixing of rates is a legislative function

of the state. This power may be exercised by the legislature its

elf or the legislature may delegate the power to a properly
constituted commission, subject to judicial review. We adopted
the' rule that contracts upon

subjects which are within the pol

ice power, even if valid, when made, must be taken to have been

entered into in view of the continuing power of the state to
control the rates to be charged by public service corporations

and that the right of the state to exercise its sovereign power,
such as the police power, cannot be altered by private contracts.

That to subordinate the exercise of the state’s authority to the
14. In re Lincoln Water Company P.U.R. Annotated 1919 B.754
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continuing operation of previous contracts would be to place to
this extent the regulation of rates in the hands of private indiv
iduals and withdraw from the control of the state so much of the

field as they might choose, by prophetic discernment, to bring

within the range of their agreements. That if the legislature had
no power to alter its police laws when co ntracts would be affected

then the most

important and valuable reforms might be precluded

by the simple device of entering into contracts for that purpose.

That the power of the state, exercised through a commission, to
regulate rates, and in the course of such regulation to vary the

terms of a contract obligation, for the reason that the contract,
when entered into with the knowledge and understanding of the

continuing authority of the state to enact laws unc^er its police

power which might render a further performance of such contract
unlawful”.

The Supreme Court of Maine, in sustaining the decision of
the commission, showed that by the law of 1831, which provided
that any charter granted after that date was subject to repeal

or alteration by the legislature, ihe commission, as an arm of
the legislature, has the power to alter, modify or disregardany

and all contracts made between municipalities serving them when
it appears that the continuance of such contracts results in an

injustice, even though the contract may have been made previous
15.
to the creation of the public utilities commission.
15. In re Lincoln Water Co. 118 Me. 367(1919)
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"This power of the legislature to impose uncompensated, duties,

even burdens, upon individuals and corporations for the general

safety is fundamental. It is the police power---- . This duty and
consequent power override all statute or contract exemption. The

state cannot free any person or corporation from subjection to

its power--.Its exercise must become wider, more varied and freq
uent with the progress of society--. When the party or property
affected, though private in its relation, the operation of the
16.
police power is still motfe extensive and frequent".
The principle of the above decision was upheld by the
Supreme Co urt in the case of the Town of Rockport vs Knox bounty

Electrical Company.

’The case arose in regard to a contract

between the town of Rockport and the

Street Railway Company, by

which contract the railway company was permitted to use the streets
of the above named town upon condition that the company would
keep a bridge in repair at its own expense. The commission appor
tioned the expense of the repairs equally between the town and

the utility company.

The court held:

"That the proceedings of the municipal officers in fixing

and determining the route and location of the railroad, and the

acceptance by the company of the location so fixed and determined,

did not constitute a contract for which the town may successfully
claim immunity from legislative interference under the contract
16. B. & M. R.R. Co. vs County Commissioners 79 Lie. 386
17. 118 Me. 179 (1920)

104845
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clause of the Constitution of the United States—• The municipal
officers were actins as public officials exercising a governmental

function for the safety of the public. The legislature has the

power to confer upon the public utility commission authority to
provide for rebuilding the bridge upon terms other than those

imposed by the municipal officers, and thus to change the terms
upon which the location was granted, to the municipality”.

Similiarly the commission has held that agreements between
cities and street railroads as to the expense of constructing
and maintaining the pavements of the streets upon which the rail

road tracks are laid are void unless sanctioned by the commission,
and it^Ls within the jurisdiction of the commi ssion to alocate

such expenses as it deems expedient. "While formerly street rail
ways were compelled by municipalities to bear a substantial por

tion of the expense of constructing and maintaining streets, at
the present time the current of thought has turned the other way.

After a street is Once properly constructed, the presence of the
car rails dauses little or no inconvenience to other users of

the highway, and comparitively little detriment to the highway

itself. Legislatures, courts, and commissions, therefore, have
easily adopted the view that in the present economic era

it is

not wise to burden street railways so heavily as to compel in
creased fares which affect all citizens and lay a heavy restrain18.
ing hand upon the transaction of business".

18. Maine P.U.C. Reports .Railroad Ho. 901 1923
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An attempt tb regulate the rates of a street railroad, by a
city ordinance granting street locations, without an express

statutory authorization, has been held to be void under the
19.
public utility act.

While formerly the municipal officers could lay out a way
across a railroad track, which might be absolutely useless or

improper, the legislature in 1917 granted to the commission the
authority to refuse to permit town ways or highways to be laid

out across, over or under a railroad track if the terms were

not reasonable.

* Also the railroad could appeal to the public

utilities commission from the decision of the municipal author

ities on the question of the location of extensions, turnouts,
and spur tracks.^’
Thus it follows that with the resumption by the State of
Maine of the authority over the public utilities, the municipal

officers have been shorn of their power of regulating the con
duct of utilities within the city limits. The franchises granted
to utilities supplying service to a municipality need no longer

define the rights and duties of the grantee and the grantor,
for the public utilities commission is invested with the duty

and power to protect the public interest even at the expense

of private interests. The municipalities have become dependent
upon the utilities commission for the preservation of their

19. In fe Cumberland County Power and Light Company Maine
P.U.C. Reports 1918
20. Maine Acts and Resolves 1917 ch.37
21. ibid ch.35.
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rights as a corporate entity to the end. that such utilities
as may be at their service do not wilfully disobey the orders
of the commission, that they give continuous and adequate serv

ice at reasonable rates#
3. Accounts and Reports

Every public utility is compelled to keep and render to

the commission uniform accounts of all business transacted, in

the form prescribed by the commission. The commission prescribes
the form of all books, accounts, papers, and records that are to
be kept^, and it is incumbent upon the utilities to comply with

the directions of the commission in this respedt. No utility

may use any form of accounting system other than that prescribed
by the commission. Further control over the accounts and reports

is secured by the provision that the commission shall audit
the accounts of all the utilities and, "all items shall be all

ocated to the accounts in the manner prescribed by the commission".

22

* The commission has authority to require the production,

by order or subpoena, of any books, accounts, papers or records

of any public utility "so that an examination thereof may be

made by the commission or under its direction".^- Thus, not
only has the commission authority over the regulation of the

accounts and reports of all utilities, but it has an express

power through the use of a subpoena to command obedience to
\

its orders.

22. Maine Acts and Resolves 1913 ch.129 see. 17
23. Ibid sec.7
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The commission is directed, to publish annual reports
(since 1923 bi-annual reports have been published.), and. such

additional reports as it deems advisable. All facts and infor

mation in the possession of the commission are open to the
public at all reasonable times.

The provision/ as to the publicity of accounts and reports

is of more than passing significance, for it is founded on the

fundamental fact that the business of a publie utility is
affected with a public interest, and that the public should

have a means of inquiring into the operations of these util
ities in which they have been granted, by law, an interest.
4. Control over Securities.
The securities of public utilities which are subject to

regulation are stocks- common and preferred, bonds and coupon
notes and other evidences of indebtedness payable more than
one year from the date thereof. It is generally accepted by

State Utility Commissions that short term paper, that is, those
payable in less than one year, are excluded from regulation.

Securities of foreign corporations are, of course, without
the jurisdiction of the Maine Public Utilities Commission.

No public utility may issue stocks, bonds or notes payab
le at periods of more than twelve months unless there shall
have been recorded upon the books of the company

the order of

the commission permitting such an increase. ‘All issues of
24. Maine Acts and Resolves 1913 ch.129 sec.36
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securities must be for lawful purposes, such as acquiring prop
erty to be used, for carrying out its corporate powers, for con

structing, completing, extending, or improving its facilities
and. service, or for the lawful refunding of its obligations, or

for other purposes as may be authorized.2®* The commission before

issuing an order for the authorization of a security issue "shall
make such inquiries for investigation, hold such hearings and
examine such witnesses, books, papers, documents or contracts
as it may deem of importance in enabling it to reachja determin-

ation? 26 •

No public utility may decrease its capital stock or declare
any stock, bond or scrip dividend or divide the proceeds of the
sale of its own or any stock, bond or scrip amoung stockholders
without the consent of the commission.

‘Public utilities are

limitied as to the amount of the increase of capital stock. Upon
approval of the commission the capital stock may be increased
to an amount not exceeding $1,000,000. The public utility voting

to increase its capital stock must file notice of the proposed

increase with the commission within fifteen days.

28

To determine the advisability of permitting a public util
ity to increase its capital stock or issue new bonds or coupon

notes, because of its importance both to the public and the util25.
26.
27.
28.

ibid sec. 35
ibid
ibid sec 37
As amended 1919 ch. 115
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ity in question, has detailed, to the commission a vast amount
of work. In many instances it has "been necessary to make a very

detailed study of the history and financial structure of the
utility asking for permission to issue securities. For those

utilities on which no previous valuation for rate making purposes

had been made, and whose past financial history was a bit uncer
tain, it has been necessary to make a valuation of the present
property, and from this valuation decide whether the security

issue could be authorized, so that over-inflation of capital
ization would not result.

There must be a definite relation between the amount of

stocks and bonds issued by a company. The aggregate of all sec-

utities should not exceed the value of the property. When a
public service corporation has no definite knowledge of the

quantity or value of the property used in the public service,
because no inventory has ever been taken or at least sufficient
ly recent to be useful, then if public control over securities

issued is to be effective, a valuation of the properties of
the utility is required.

The commission has on several occassions been petitioned

for permission to issue securities for purposes not enumerated
in the Public Utility Law. In 1917 the Rumford and Bethel
Street Railroad Company wished to issue common stock for promot
ion service. The commission refused the request on the grounds
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"that it is not the policy of the Maine Commission to authorize
the issuance of a large amount of common stock for promotion

services in the case of a new corporation , on the theory that
nobody can tell what such securities may prove to be worth, it

being more desirable that promotion fees be paid in terms of
understandable value".

Probably the most important decision of the commission
relative to security issues is the "bond discount case".30*

The Central Maine Power Company asked the commission to approve
of the issuance of 7,913 shares of common capital stock of the

company for the purpose of the lawful discharge and refunding
of its lawful obligations incurred in providing

necessary fane’s

for the acquisition of property used for the purpose of carry

ing out its corporate powers—, to the amount of $791,386.61
which was the amount of unamortized discount on the several

bond issues of the Central Maine Power Company at the date of

the petition. The commission refused to authorize the issue
and the case was appealed to the Maine Supreme Court which up

held the decision of the commission. The opinion of the court
was that "it is perfectly legitimate for a utility to sell its

bonds at less than their face value. Indeed experience has prov

en that a saving in interest is effected by so doing and that

such bonds are easily marketable. But if a $1,000 bond which
could be sold at par provided it bore interest at six percent

29. Public Utility Reports Annonated 1917 B. 898
30.In re Central Maine Power,Company.PublicUtility Reports
Annotated 1930 B.l
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sells for $900 when paying five per cent, it is apparent that

the obligor pays for the use ^f the $900 which it receives, not
only $50 during the life of the bond, but $100 additional at its
maturity. Bond discount is,therefore, only another term for

deferred interest—-. It could not be seriously argued that int

erest should be paid out of capital. It must be paid out of earn
ings and any attempt to capitalize a deferred interest charge
or a note given to cover such a charge is an attempt to capital
'll

ize future earnings7

The commission exercises close supervision and control over
securitiesn Issuance is allowed only upon authorization of the

commission,

based upon a statement of the amount and character

of the issue desired

and its purpose.

Under this method the

financial structure of the utility is studied, a time and place
is set for a hearing,

and the application investigated.

If the

issue is authorized, it fixes the amount of the issue and speci

fies the purposes for which the funds

thereof: may be used.

realized from the sale

This strict superversion of the securities

is an important aspect of regulation both to the utility and the

public, for the utility is under a recurrent necessity of attract

ing new investments from the investing public, and the public,
if it is confident

that new Issues of securities are authorized

only upon the best judgement of the commission, may Eagerly

up the new issue.
31. In re Central Maine Bower Co. 130 Maine 28,35. (

)

take
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5. Rates and Service.
The aim of public utility regulation is to secure adequate

and continuous service at reasonable rates.

Thus it becomes

incumbent upon the commission to see that the rates, tolls, or
charges of the utility granting service to the public "Shall be
reasonable and just, taking into consideration the fair value
of all its property with a fair return thereon, its rights and

plant as a going concern, business risk and depreciation.
Every unjust or unreasonable charge for such service is hereby
prohibited and declared unlawful".

The Public Utility law of the State of Maine grants to the

commission

utility

authority to inquire into the rates exacted by any

doing business within the state, either upon its own

initiative, or upon complaint of ^bused^ persons.

The commission

is authorized to ^’sumarilly/investigate, with of without notiee,

upon its own initiative the^ustice of any rate or charge". The
commission is obliged to investigate the rates charged by any
utility when "ten persons, firms or corporations or associations,
aggrieved" make a written complaint against the practice of the

utility or when the utility itself makes a complaint as to any
33 • *
matter affecting its own product, service or charges.
\
Immediately upon the filing of a complaint the commission
must notify the utility of the complaint anqthe nature of the

complaint against it.

If after ten days the cause of the complaint

32. Maine Acts and Resolves 1913 ch.129 sec.10
33. Ibid sec. 41 and 46.
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is not removed then the commission shall set a time and place
34 •
for a formal hearing.
No orders, however, affecting the

practices of the utility complained against shall be entered
by the commission without a formal hearing.

If the commission finds that the rates, tolls, schedules,
or charges complained against are discriminatory then the commiss-

has power to order a new schedule of rates, tolls, or charges,

substituted as shall be reasonable.

* Likewise it is provided

that if upon a formal hearing it is found that the service com
plained against is unjust, inadequate, discriminatory, or that

reasonable service cannot be obtained then the commission has
power to establish and substitute such service as shall be

just and reasonable.

•

Exceptions to the decision of the commission may be made
only in question, but while questions of law are pending, how

ever, the orders of the commission shall remain in force, and

no injunction shall be issued suspending or staying the orders
of the commission while such questions of law are being decided
37.
upon.
It is made unlawful for any public utility to charge one

person or corporation more for a given service than it charges

another person for a like service; or to give undue preference to

any person or corporation;or to subject any person or corporation
34.
35.
$6.
37.

Ibid sec.42
Ibid sec.44
Ibid
Ibid sec.54

70

to undue prejudice, in any respect however* Moreover it is made
unlawful for any person or corporation knowlingly to solicit or
accept a rebate, concession or discrimination in respect to

public utility service within the state. But nothing in the act

is to be construed to prohibit a utility from entering into a
reasonable agreement with its customers regarding rates and

service; but before any such arrangements are made lawful it

must be approved by the commission.
Decisions and orders of the commission in regard to the
services performed by the utilities have been more numerous

than those that have arisen in regard to rates and the issuance
of securities. Yet the commission has followed no general prin

ciples in deciding on these complaints for service. Rather, each
case has been decided upon its own merits. When a complaint is

made to the commission regarding the service that is being rend
ered by a utility, the commission attempts through informal hear
ings to bring the public and the utility together to reach an

agreement or compromise without resorting to a formal decree.
During the first year of its existence, the commission stated

that they haft arranged satisfactorily "more than ninty percent
of all complaints without the necessity of a hearing”.®8*

Complaints regarding rates are not so easily disposed, and

they will be considered below under valuation.
In addition to those duties which look to rates, service,

and the financial structure of the utility, which become the
38. Maine Public Utility Commission Reports 1915 p. 11
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main function of a public utilities commission, the Maine Commiss
ion has had imposed upon it additional duties which are only

incidentally related to the main function of regulation and
control. These commissional duties retain a hang-over from the

duties of the old railroad commission by the requirement that
it inspect railroads, their rolling stock, roads, and bridges.

The commission is authorized to order repairs of its rolling
stock, bridges and roads when in its opinion public safety so

demands it. This work commands the major portion of the time of

the chief inspector, who is required by law to be an experienced
railroad man. In addition, the commission

is authorized to in

vestigate into grade crossings and to decide what should be

done concerning the abolition of such crossings when public
safety so demands. The erection of stations, the erection of

gates at crossings, and the regulation of fenders and headlights

on street cars are also duties of the commission which were once
those of the board of railroad commissioners.

The inspection department of the commissioji must investig

ate all accidents of serious nature upon the premises of any
public utility and make a report to the commission. These invest
igations are for the purpose of making recommendations so as to
prevent the recurrence of similiar accidents•

By the public utility act of 1913 the commission was also

invested with the powers and duties of the Maine Water Power

Commission. This duty, in itself, places an unlimited amount
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of work on the hands of the commission for it is provided, that
"the commission shall collect information relating

to the water

powers of the state, the flow of rivers, and their drainage
area, the location, nature and size of the lakes and ponds in

the state and their respective value and capacity as storage
reservoirs, and such other hydrographic data as they may deem
of value in devising the best methods for the improvement of

the natural storage basins of the state, and the creation of
new storage reservoirs, with a view of conserving the capacity
39 •
of the water powers of the state” •
The "Water Pollution Act” of 1917, charged the commission

with the important duty of supervising water companies to the

extent of preventing the sources of all domestic supplies from

being polluted. This work is carried on in cooperation with the
40.
State department of Health.
In 1925 the legislature added to the already long list of

duties of the commission the duty of regulating advertising

signs upon public highways. This act refers to any advertising

device so situated as to obstruct clear vision on intersecting

highways or in any way prevent the safe use of the public high
ways. The act does not apply to those signs "erected or main

tained with the approval of the State Highway Commission, sole
ly for the purpose of safeguarding, facilitating or protecting

39. As amended 1925 ch.187
40. Maine Acts and Resolves 1917 ch.98
41. Maine Acts and Resolves 1925 ch. 188

Tb.

Valuation for Rate Making Purposes

Under the

J

Maine Public Utilities

Commission.

The law that create^he Public Utilities Commission of
Maine conferred upon the commission the power to "fix a reason

able value upon all property of any publiv utility usedor requir

ed to be used in its service to the public within the state when

ever it deems a valuation thereof to be necessary for the fix
ing of fair and reasonable rates, tolls and charges".The

law, however, was silent as to the "proper treatment and prin
ciples applicable to valuation"2*, and such principles and meth

ods, relating to valuation, as might be employed were left to

the discretion of the commission.
In their first annual report, the commission stated that

due to the chaotic condition of affairs, they refrained from
attempting on their own motion, any valuation of the properties

of public utilities. They pointed out that due to the financial

resources available a general valuation would be prohibitive.
The valuation of electrival utilities alone, they claimed, would

so exhaust their resources as to leave them with no money to
3.
perform any other services.
Before the end of 1916, many of the larger utilities in the

state, after conferences with the commission, began complete
valuation work on their propertiesThe commission itself,
1.
2.
3.
4.

Maine Acts and Resolves 1913 ch 128 see.34
Maine P.U.C. Reports 1915 p. 39
ibid
These companies were the Cumberland County Power and Light,
the Bangor Railway and Electric, and the Lewiston Gas Light.
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because of complaints against rates or practices, entered upon
independent valuation work for several utilities, amoung them

being the St. Croix Gas Light Company, the Biddeford and Saco
Water Company, and the Peaks Island Corporation. The commission
announced that in order to make their service to the public more

general and to assist the smaller companies, they were making
valuations of one or more companies in each county so as to
obtain a more accurate working knowledge of local conditions in

each community, and thus bring the department into more intim

ate relation with each local public.

We have seen that there are in vogue two accepted methods
of determining the rate base upon which a public utility is

allowed by law to earn a reasonable return; first, the histor
ical cost basis which looks to the original cost of construct

ing the utility’s property, or that sum of money prudently in
vested in the properties; and secondly, that method which attempts
to determine the present fair value of the properties of the
utility used and useful in the service of the public by reprod

ucing these propeties at prevailing prices of land, labor, and

materials•
In the absence of any controlling statutory provision, or

precedent, in the st&toe as to what shall be the measure of "fair
value”, the commission left with the use of its own discretion

in the matter, would probally be influenced by those decisions

rendered by the United States Supreme Court, and public service
5. Maine P.U.C. Reports 1916 p.7
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commissions of other states, as to what seems to be the approved

basis upon which a rate base is to be determined. The most import
ant United States Supreme Court decisions, during the life of

the Maine Commission, have enunciated the rule that the measure
of "fair value" is the reproduction cost basis based on prices

obtaining as 6f the time the inquiry is to be made.
In our analysis of the policy of the Maire Public Utilities

Commission in regard to valuation for rate amking purposes,we
will attempt to reach two conclusions; (1) what has been the

measure of fair value employed by the commission. That is, has

the commission utilized Reproduction cost basis, actual cost
basis, or some form of prudent investment in their valuation
work, and (B) has the commission been consistent in the use

of any, one measure of fair value.

In order to show what method or methods the Maine Public

Utilities Commission has employed in measuring "fair value"
for rate making purposes, we are including a resume of nine

cases rendered by the commission which we feel are representat

ive of the findings of the commission. It is not to be inferred,
however that such final conclusions as we may reach with refer
ence to valuation for rate making purposes in Maine are based
solely upon the evidence presented in these cases.

In the Lewiston, Augusta, and Waterville Street Railway
g

Company * decision of 1916, the commission believed that the
6. Maine P.U.C. Reports 1916
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original cost of a utility, constructed, within a reasonable

time under normal conditions, when satisfactorily obtainable id
preferable in rate cases to cost new, or cost of reproduction

less depreciation, in fixing present value. "This (original

cost) is now recognized as the modern doctrine for the reason
that if the books of a public utility were properly and accurately

kept when construction was begun, having been properly and
accurately kept since, and all or practically all vouchers have

been retained?, the true value of the property upon any given date
can be ascertained with substantial accuracy;— We therefore

find that the original or actual cost is the approved method—".
In the St'. Croix Gas Light Case of 1918, ’the commission
employed< the reproduction cost less depreciation method, based
on a five year average of unit prices as of 1915, for fixing

the rate b«se upon which the company was to earn a fair return.
The commission thus affected a change in policy in the method

employed in determining fair value. In the previous case they
stated that original cost was the approved method, yet in this

instance they have used reproduction cost less depreciation as the

measure of fair value. As was shown above, the St. Croix Gas

Light Company was One of the first utilities upon which the

commission had undertaken valuation work.
In the St. Croix case the commission refused to allow an
item for going value, ruling that "an allowance for going value,

*7. Maine P.U.C. Reports 1918
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in rate cases, is the capitalization of that sum of money by

which the business has failed, to earn a fair return on the
investment. No allowance will be made where this condition does

not exist". This, in general, has been the rule followed by
the commission in determining going value.

Looking to the Portland Gas Light ^ase of 1918

8•

, we find

that the commission has employed a hybrid of reproduction cost

and actual eost in determining the present fair value of this

company. The valuation of the company was made as of Oct.l, 1915,
by C. H. Teeny and Company. The valuation was made on the basis
of reproduction cost new. The commission accepted the figures as

found by the experts, and after making allowances for certain
overhead charges, added the net cost of additions to the prop

erty since 1915, and then deducted the accrued depreciation.

The results obtained was considered the present fair value of

the utility.
Similarily this procedure was followed by the commission
9
in the second Biddeford and Saco Water Company fcase.’ In a

previous case^’the commission fixed the rate base of this same

company at $1,030,620, which was based on reproduction cost
less depreciation, the unit items of property being based on a
five year average as of Aug. 21, 1915. In the second case the

commission decided that the valuation found as of 1915, used
in the first case, should stand. Net additions to the property

8. Maine P.U.C. Reports 1919
9. Maine P.U.C. Reports 1920
,
10. Percy R. Rich et al vs Biddeford and Saco Water Company,
Maine P.U.C. Reports 1918
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from 1915 to 1919 were added, and the accrued depreciation de

ducted. ”A valuation made as of a certain date can be kept up

to any other date very easily, for the reason that under the

accounting methods applied by this commission all capitalizable
additions to property appear upon the books of the company with

the exact cost thereof, and i^is a simple matter to build up to

any particular date, by the process of addition and depreciat
ion, the value of the existing property at that particular date”
In twojcases, in 1921, the commission considers the use of

prudent investment as the measure of fair value. In re York
11.
County Water Company
it was stated that the reproduction less
depreciation figure, based on a five year average, was nearly

the same as the prudent investment figure. However, the commiss

ion felt that it was not ready to change absolutely from the
reproduction less depreciation basis, and in this particular
case reproduction cost basis would be employed. It was not stated
what years were included in the five year average, but the rate

base of $780,373 is somewhat in excess of the rate base of $659,
12.
708, fixed in 1918,
which was based on a ten year average of

actual cost figures. It is presumed that some weight must have
been given to prices in existence at the time of the inquiry.

In the same year, 1921, it is noted that the commission
refused to reproduce the properties of the Lewiston Gas Light

11. Public Utility Reports Annotated 1921 A. 439
12. In re York County Water Co. ,Maine P.U.C. Reports 1918
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Company

13.

at prices in effect as of Oct. 1, 1920, or on a five

year average ending Oot.l, 1920, for they considered the reproduction cost method as never entirely satisfactorily, and due to

the period of exceedingly high prices it was proving even more
unsatisfactorily. The capitalization of the company was as follows
Bonds at 4^>
Common stock
Other indebtedness
Total capitalization

$200,000
400,000
49,694.04
$^49,69¥.O?

The fair value of the property was stated to be "not less

than $650,000. The fair value of this company seems to have been
based entirely on its capitalization. There is no evidence to
show that any other method was considered, unless it was prud

ent investment.

The Castine Water Company in 1923

14 •

adopted the reproduction

less depreciation figure found by the commission for its rate
base. It was stated that, "the reproduction cost less depreciat

ion on basis of present prices would be much in excess of this
figure"•
In checking over the valuation figures of the properties
15.
of the New England Telephone and Telegraph Company
in Maine,
presented by the chief engineer of the company who made the

valuation on the basis of reproduction cost, the commission

refused to allow an item for pavements over mains. The policy
of the commission does not seem to have been to allow the utility

to reproduce their properties at present prices and under pres

ent conditions, otherwise this item would have been allowed.

13. Public Utility Reports Annotated 1921 A. 561
14. Maine P.U.C. Reports 1923-24
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In re Camden and. Rockland. Water Company,

16

1929, it was

stated, that, "Reproduction cost and. reproduction cost less deprec
iation are important elements to be considered, along with other

evidence introduced in the case, in determining fair value" •
The property was appraised as of December 31, 1928, the results

being composed of the various itemized accounts as of January

1, 1928 plus all net additions to the plant during 1928, The
book-fixed capital was in excess of any appraisals made, and
the rate base as fixed by the commission. The rates were increas
ed to provide a 6.3 percent return on the rate base. Why this

particular rate of return was chosen we do notlcnow, but the

commission must have felt that this would yield a fair return
on its capital stock. This case has not been decided on the

merits of any one single basis. Consideration has been given to
reproduction cost, actual cost, and the capitalization of the

company.
The Commission, in its second report, 1916, announced its

policy .with regard to determining the rate base, or fair value

when it stated that valuations were being made of several of the
larger utilities in the state, and that "when these companies,

and this commission shall have on their files this complete,
accurate, and up to date information, the matter of keeping it
up to the minute each year will, under present methods of account

ing be comparatively simple---- • We shall then all know the exact
ratio of the return in the fotbl of rates, to the fair value of
15. Public Utility Reports Annotated 1926 B. 247
16. Public Utility Reports Annotated 1929 E. 325
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the property devoted, to the public service, and. the amount to
17.
be charged, to produce that return”.
In the Lewiston, Augusta and Waterville Railroad Company

decision, which is summarized above, the commission held that,

"the original cost method is the approved method in fixing
present values (fair value) of the property for the purposes
of rate making; and, the original cost of a utility, construct
ed within a reasonable time under normal conditions, when satis

factorily obtainable, is preferable in rate cases to cost new,
or cost of reproduction less depreciation, in fixing rates" •

The determination of the present value of the property
now used in the service of the public, as interpreted by the
commission, means the original cost of construction plus cost
of additions that are proper capital charges under approved

accounting methods.
The intent of the commission seems to have been to devise
some standardized form of rate base which could be brought up

to date by the simple process of addition and depreciation.
Professor Hormell points out that this, "result might have mater

ialized.had the commission been able to carry out its plan of
physical valuation or had it been able or seen fit to follow
the ’prudent investment or original cost’ theory in arriving
, « ,
_ 18 •
at fair value"•

It was stated in the Peaks Island Corporation decision of
17. Maine P.U.C. Reports 1916 p.8
18. Hormell, Maine Public Utilities p.57
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19.
1917

that the valuation of this utility was made on the basis

of reproduction cost less depreciation, for the data available

was too meagre to determine its original cost. The decisions
rendered by the commission from 1917 to 1920 show that reproduct
ion cost basis has replaced actual cost basis as the factor to

be given the greater weight in determining fair value, ifet it

can be seen that the commission still holds to the theory that
a valuation made as of a certain date can be brought up to the

minute under accounting methods. This method of determining
present fair value is clearly shown in the Portland Gas Light,

and the second Biddeford and Saco Water Company decisions,

included above, and is substantiated by other decisions rendered
by the commission down to 1920. These original valuations which

were based on reproduction cost were, in the main, measured
over a period of years which the commission felt represented a

normal cost average rather than on prices obtaining as of the

time of the inquiry. Thus in the Bar Harbor and Union River
Power Company ease

‘the valuation of the company’s properties

was made by the company on the basis of reproduction cost with

unit prices measured over a five year period as of 1916. The
commission used the five year period ending in 1917, for the
reason that they had used that average in nearly all their val

uation work, and believed this five year average more represen

tative than the five year average ending in 1916.
19. George H. Briggs et al vs Peaks Island Corporation. Public
Utility Reports Annotated 1917 E. 750
20. Public Utility Reports Annotated 1921 I). 298
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The rfprod.netion cost

hypothesis was pushed to the front

in valuation cases due to the great upheavel in prices occasioned
by the World War.

21

* The most telling argument for the reproduct

ion cost basis, either as the sole standard or as an important
element in fair value, that has been advanced is the deprivation
of the utility’s right of a fair return on a fair value, due to

the fall in the purchasing power of the return during a period
of abnormally high prices. The rate base must be fixed at a high

enough level to compensate the common stockholders for this fall

in the purchasing power of the return ooasioned by increased
costs of materials, land and labor. "In all the vast amount of

discussion favoring the reproduction cost basis of valuation,

there has never been a proposal suggesting even remotely that
any adjustment should be made in the return allowed to bond

holders. The argument has proceeded throughout from the stand
point of making the higher valuation on all the properties
employed in the public service, whether the funds were provided
through the issue of securities cwith a fixed return

or through

the issue of common stock, Such an adjustment, it is clear,

would result in giving the entire benefit of the increase on the
entire investment to the common stockholders and none to the
22 •
others who had furnished the bulk of the moneys" •

The commission, in several instances has stated that the
outstanding securities of a utility throw no light on its fair

value, and is given no consideration in the fixing of a rate
21. See chart opposite page 27
22. Bauer, Effective Regulation of Public Utilities. Page 125
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base. While this may be true in some instances, it does not hold
true for all cases. Let us consider what is meant by a fair

return on a fair value. Out of this fair return that is earned,

the utility pays its interest to bondholders and dividends to
stockholders respectively. The amount necessary to pay the int
erest on bonds is fixed and readily ascertainable,but the return

to the stockholders is not a_fixed amount, except in the case

of preferred stock, and depends upon the relative risk of the

capital invested in a particular utility.

public utility must,

from time to time, attract new capital to the enterprise, but
if the return to the

investor is not sufficiently large enough

to compensate him for the risk to the investment, then the prob
lem of securing additional capital becomes acute to the utility.

In addition to the amount necessary to pay interest and dividends

the utility should be provided a sum to build up a surplus and

thus buttress and strengthen its credit.

It may be only a

coincidence that the capitalization (based on the par value of
the securities) as shown on the books of the company, and the

fair value as found, in many instances were nearly identical.
And a valuation used as a basis of security issue has been deemed
23.
not inappropriate to use as a base upon which to fix rates.

In their report for 1920, the commission points out many

fallacies encountered in the use of the reproduction cost basis.
The use of reproduction cost, they pointed out, by engineers in

23. In re Penobscot County Water Company 1924 (Stenographic Copy)
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the early days of regulation was based on prices at which
material and labor could be obtained to reproduce a plant over

a five or ten year period immediately prior to the time when
a valuation; was being attempted. But in a period of mounting

costs which followed the beginning of the war it was seen that
to include any of the war years in the five year average, would

result in an exaggerated figure. As seen, the commission in the

Lewiston Gas Light decision refused to employ either present
prices or a five year average as of 1920 as a basis upon which

to determine present fair value. One of the big objections to

the use of reproduction cost as a standard of fair value is

the flexibleness of the rate base. Each time a new complaint
regarding rates comes before the commission it necessitates a

re-valuation of the utility based on present prices which
might or might not be representative.
"If we should undertake to fix as a present fair value of
the company’s property the amount obtained by applying present

prices, in three or five years from now, these prices might drop
to the pre-war level, and would the amount obtained in 1920 be

the fair value of the property in 1923, 1924, or 1925, or
would we again have to make a valuation and apply prices obtain24 •
ing at the time of the new valuation”?

24. In re Lewiston Gas Light Co.,P. U. R. Annotated 1921 A. 561.
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Although the York County Water Company was given the benefit
of some years of high prices, the policy of the commission since

1920 has not been to base reproduction cost upon present prices

and under present conditions.

In the Penobscot Case of 1924,25
26
and in the Milo Water Company Case of 1928,
the commission deter

mined present value by using a valuation previously made, and to

this base as found added all net additions since made to the
property.

This method of determining present fair value is, what

we have previously termed, a hybrid of reproduction costs basis
and actual costs basis.

The commission on several occasions has favored the employ
ment of prudent investment as a measure of fair value.

What

statements the commission has made in reference to prudent invest
ments have been more in the nature of dicta, rather than in the

practical application of this theory.
The first commission reports seemed to bring out the fact

that the commission was rather optimistic in developing a policy
based upon some form of prudent investment•

In 1920 they still

favored this method because of the difficulties encountered in the
use of the reproduction cost ba,sis.

"Engineers, commissions, and

courts have been seeking a better method of valuation, and all these
agencies hrernow very seriously considering the ascertainment of
an Investment

cost and using that as a foundation and perhaps a

25. Penpbscot County Water Co(stenographic copy)
26. P. U. R. Annotated 1928E 650
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principle part of that which enters into value”.• In the
Lewiston Gas Light case the commission again pointed out that

”the actual investment made by the company from the beginning
is thought to be worthy of very serious consideration in arriv
ing at a fair value”.28* And again, in the York County Water

case the commission stated that the reproduction cost figure and
the prudent investment figure were nearly the same, but "inas

much as this commission is not entirely ready to change absolut
ely from the reproduction less depreciation theory, we shall in
29 •
this particular case adhere to the reproduction cost theory"•

During the last few years the commission has not talked

of prudent investment. They have probably been influenced by
the United States Supreme Court which has continued to hold
for reproduction cost basis as the measure of fair value.
Prudent investment, however, has much to be said in its

favor. What the promulgators of the prudent investment theory

seek is a fixed and definite rate base uninfluenced by changes
in the price level. Under this theory the dependent variable
will be the rate of return which will vary inversely as the

value of the dollar varies, or as the purchasing power of the
return varies. Under the reproduction cost hypothesis the var
iable factor is the rate base which moves up or down in direct
relationship with the general price level. This may be more
clearly explained by the use of an example.

27. Maine P.U.C. Reports 1920 page 13
28. P.U.R. Annotated 1921 A. 571
29. Ibid page 442 (in re York County Water Company)
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Let us suppose that a new company has Just been established

at a cost of one hundred thousand dollars.

This figure would

represent both the original cost andthe reproduction cost of
the business, and this problem weshall

assume that this figure

is a fair value of the property used and useful in the public
service.
The capitalization is as follows:

Bonds 5£
Preferred stock 7j6
Common stoc>

capitalization
$70,000*
10,000
20,000
siucfow

fixed charges
$3,500
700

$T^5U

It is decided that the company is entitled to earn a seven

percent return on its fair value.

The fair return out of which

to pay interest to bondholders and dividends to stockholders

is $7,000.

Deducting $4,200, the fixed charges, from this

amount the net income available for common stock is $2,800,
which represents a 14 percent

*S

return on $20,000 of common stock.

The return on common stock varies with the ratio between the
outstanding stocks and bonds.

Thus if the capitalization were as

follows:
Bonds 5^
Common stock

$50,000
50,000

$2,500

Then deducting $2,500, the fixed charges, from the fair return

of $7,000, would leave $4,500 for the common stockholders, or

a 9 percent return on $50,000 of capital stock.

While both the

♦For our purposes, we have eliminated the factor of a sinking fun€«
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public utility commission, and the courts maintain that the
capitalization of a utility is not given consideration in val

uation for rate making purposes, ii^.s seen that the ratio between

bonded indebtedness and capital stock does influence the fair
return to be allowed, for the return in the form of dividends

must be sufficient to compensate the stockholders for the risk
incurred in thlir investment, and to attract additional capital

into the enterprise.

Let us suppose further that we are in a period of rising
price levels when interest rates have increased, and the purchas

ing power of the dollar has diminished. The company complains

that the rate of return that it now receives is confiscatory,
and that its fair value should be in excess of $100,000.

Now we may do either of two things—increase the rate base
or increase the rate of return so as to allow the company a

fair return sufficient to counteract the increase in interest
and the depreciated purchasing power of its dollar.

By using the reproduction cost basis we may suppose that
the present fair value of this companyis $130,000. A 7 percent

return on this amount would yield a fair return of $9,100.

Deducting the fixed charges of the amount of $4,200, found in

the first capitalization schedule, the amount available for
common stock would be $4,900, or a return of approximately 24

percent on $20,000 Of common stock.

Using the second capitali

zation schedule shown above, the amount available for common

90.

stock would, be $6,600($9,100-2,5000 or a return of about 14 per
cent on $50,000 Of common stock.

By using the prudent investment Method we may arrive at the
same result, viz. an increase in the fair return to $9,000, by

merely increasing the rate of return from 7 percent to 9 percent
and. leaving the rate base unchanged..

By increasing the rate of

return instead, of the rate base we eliminate costly evaluation

and. more costly litigation that usually follows the utilization of

the reproduction cost method of determining what shall be the

rate base of a utility upon which it is to earn a fair return.
In the former instance we have made valuation work an accounts
ing proposition, while in the latter case we have made the

whole field of valuation one of engineering economics permeated
with expert op onion, ^conjectures, andMignif led guesses.

*

When we increase the rate base of a public utility 25 or

50 percent hardly a ripple may occur on the wave of public

oponion, but if we were to increase the rate of return from 7
to 9 or 10 percent, probably the commission who granted this in

creased rate ofreturn would be subject to no end of criticism
SO. "This method of determining value (cost of reproduction
less depreciation) usually included percentages for engineering
service never rendered, hypothetical efficiency of unknown labor,
conjectural depreciation, oponion as to the condition of prop
erty, the supposed action of the owners, and of course, its
correctness depends upon whether superintendence was or would be
wise or foolish; the investment inprovident or frugal. It is
bases upon prophecy instead of reality, and depends so much
upon half-truths that it bears only a remote resemblance to facts,
and rises at best, only to the plain of the digrified guess".
Michigan Public Utilities Commission, in re Michigan State Tele
phone Company,?. U. R. Annotated 1921 C545, 554-555.
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by a public which is used to speaking
or seven percent.

in terms of five, six,

Yet both methods lead to the same result,

a factor which the public and the utilities must be educated to,

if the prudent investment theory is ever to rise beyond being
"just a theory" and have practical application in public utility

economics in the future.
The situation

in Maine seems to be that the commission

favors one theory and uses another.
do employ is hard to say.

But just what theory they

At least they have not been consistant

in the use of any one measure of fair value.

In their report

for 1922 we find this statment:
"In the past^valuation work has been undertaken only in
connection with some partictLlar case and in these circumstances

the results may at times be colored to a greater or less extent
by the purposes for which the valuation is being made.

It is my

belief that a systematic valuation of all the public utilities

properties in the state should be started.

Such a process would

result in putting all of the properties on the bases and would
eliminate the chance of the results being

influenced by the

circumstances of a particular case —, and that such valuations

made on an established basis could readily be changed to any
other basis deemed necessary in a particular case by direct com-

parison of the bases involved".

*

31. Maine P. U. C. Reports 1922 page 14(statement of William
Black, Chief Engineer)
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The commission has in mind, a definite policy for valuation.

They look to the development of a standardized rate basis which
will remove from valuation work all discrepancies, dignified

guesses, conjectures, etc. which have permeated the field of
valuation in the past.

Yet the realization of this policy or

goal seems impossible of attainment both because no one measure
of fair value has ever been recognized by both the state commissions

and\^he courts as >he sole standard of determining fair value,

and because the commission never has, anc^srobably never will have
sufficient financial resources to carry out such a

program.

The conclusions arrived at in these cases on valuation
renedered by the Maine Commission, have been, as a rule, the

results of haphazard methods based on no well established prin

ciple or theory.

While the great majority of these decisions

state that reproduction cost basis

less depreciation has Been used,

we find no evidence that reproduction cost has ever been based

solely on present prices or prices obtained as of the time the

inquiry was made.

It would be more appropriate to call it an

"average method".

Nor have the finding^of the commission been

based wholly on an average reproduction cost of the physical
properties of the utility.

In many instances they contain a

hybrid of reproduction cost and actual cost,and have been colored

• to a considerable extent by the capitalization

of the utility,

the criminal cost when ascertainable, and^the rates
to produce treasonable return.

to be charged

93

Thus It appears that the Maine Commission has not adhered

rigidly or consistently to any one method of determining fair

value•
The failure of the Maine Commission to develope a consist

ent policy is not a situation unique to regulation by state comm

issions. A recent study of the "Massachussetts Plan" by Irston
32.
Barnes
reveals that this state which has long been looked
upon as a follower of the prudent investment theory, has been

neither consistent nor rigid in the application of this theory.

The Maine Commission is undermanaged and underpa id. Changes in
its personnel have been frequent. New commissioners bring with
them new ideas, so that the development of a consistent policy

on these grounds alone would be almost impossible of accomplish

ment •
The commission combines the functions of a couht and a leg

islature. Its close resemblance to a court is well displayed by

the provision that there can be no appeal from the findings of
the commission to any court so far as questions of fact are con
cerned, only questions of law may be appealed. Several decisions

rendered by the commission have been appealed to the Maine Supr

eme Court, but so far as we have been able to discover no commiss
ion decision has ever been reviewed on the grounds that the commiss

ion policy with reference to valuation for rate making purposes
has led to confiscation of the property of the utility, or has
32. Barnes, Irston R., Public Utility Control in Massachussetts,
Yale University Press 1930
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resulted in the granting of rates which have been exorbitant

and unreasonable from the standpoint of the consumer.

Criticism

has been directed toward the evidence, relating to fact that the

commission has introduced or excluded in particular cases.
Noteworthy is the Penobscot County Water case decided in 1924.

Two petitions by the water company were heard concurrently.

One asked that authority be granted by the petitioner to consol
idate and combine all of the petitioner’s water works serving the

cities

of Oldtown and Brewer and the towns of Milford, Orono,

and Veazie, into a single system; the other petition was for an

increase in rates.
The question of valuation was contested throughout the hear

ings.

W. R. Pattangall, who represented the towns of Orono and

Veazie, in his summary of the case claimed that the fair value of

the properties as found by the commission was in excess of its
true value, andtfeontended that the sum paid to the former owner
by the petitioner should be considered

by the commissioner as an

important, if not controlling factor in fixingjthe present fair

value of the properties for a rate base. "We were not permitted
to show the price for which this properties purchased in 1922z

but the commission Imows the price; we know the price; the com33
plaining company knows the price”.
In the decision of the

commissioh

we find this statment;"Although the remonstrants

were not permitted to offer evidence in the form presented as

33. Summary of Argument presented by W. R. Pattangall in
Penobscot County Water Company vs. Itself page 12.
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to the sum paid, for the property by the present owner, it is

nevertheless, in the record, that the amount so paid was known
to the commission, and. the commission accorded an opportunity

to all parties to present evidence of what the fair value of the

property was on which rates might lawfully be based. The remonstrantsj however, offered no such evidence". 34 * An increase in
rates was granted by the commission.
The rules of procedure in the hearing of complaints are

similiar to those of a court. The law provides that,"all

processes shall be served and the practices and rules of evidence
shall be the same as in civil action in the supreme judicial

court"•

* The commission may order the appearance of witnesses

at a hearing and, "each witness---- shall receive for his atten

dance the fee and mileage provided for witnesses in a civil

case in the supreme judicial court".

’ Any failure to comply

with the orders of the commission is declared to be "contempt

of the commission", and is punishable, "and in the same manner
and to the same extent as contempt is punished by courts of

record"•

37-

Looking to the legislative function of the commission we

find that such investigations as the commission makes on its
own motion may be divided into two classes—those of general

public interest, and those where less than ten persons have, or
may have, a real grievance, but are unable through lack of numbers

34.
35.
36.
37.

In re Penobscot County Water Co. (stenographic copy page 5
Maine Acts and Resolves 1913 ch.129 sec.57
Ibid sec.50
Ibid sec. 53
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to institute formal complaint themselves. .

The effectivness of public utility control andregulation
cannot be measured alone by its judicial function, which gives to

the commission a weapon by which it may compel obedience to its
orders, without taking into consideration its legislative function,
which requires that all public utilities be investigated in the

interest of the public.

But when the judicial function of a

public service commii&ion outweigh its legislative functions,

then public interest may be sacfificed in favor of private interests

The task of regulation is a very difficult one.

Regulation

by state commissioners, to be effective, must be placed in the

hands of commissioners who have marked ability, unimpeachable
integrity, and who are, at all times, imbued with high ideals
of public service.,

As we have pointed out before, changes in the

personnel of the Maine Public Utilities Commission have been

Men who receive trainring in the interpretation of the

public utility law, and the method adopted by the commission
in treating with certain problems, soon pass on to accept higher

salaried positions

with the utilities companies, an<? thus give

to them the benefit of their previous training.

The tendency has been to extend, rather than to restrPet

the jurisdiction and powers of the Maine Commission.

Working

under limited appropriations, and with a limited personnel,the

commission has been

forced to treat with matters not germane
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to the main functions of public utility control, so that it has

t-ended to become more in the nature of a judiciary committee,
rather than an investigating committee.

Under these conditions

the full vigor ahd force of the utilities commission cannot be
expended to promote the public interest, which becomes the
desideratum of public utility regulation.

The Maine Legislature has conferred upon the public utilities
commission broad powers.

But this is not enough.

Such a comm

ission mast be provided with resources sufficient to carry its
investigations into all phases of public utility activity if

regulation is to be effective.
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